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In this thesis we investigate the development of vertical web portals (vortals) that 
fulfill targeted organizational mission needs.  This specific type of portal provides 
narrow-scoped data, information and services while affording the user accessibility over a 
public network, such as the Internet.  As part of the investigation, we present a 
methodology for architecting such portals with explicit consideration of security policy.  
The methodology, along with some preliminary guidelines, is intended to serve as a first 
approximation of a framework for both the development of vertical portals and the 
definition of doctrine on the application of vortals.  We illustrate this methodology with 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A web portal or portal is a “web site or service that offers a broad array of 
resources and services such as e-mail, forums, search engines, and on-line shopping 
(Webopedia.com, 2002).”  In World Wide Web information management, the portal has 
become king.  What defines the portal in this role comes down to its flexibility in 
allowing collaboration, integration, aggregation and consolidation of data, information 
and services into a single user interface that is accessible through any standard Internet 
web browser. 
 
Figure 1.   Portal Architecture (From White, 2002) 
 
Portals are very powerful tools which provide a means to deal with information 
overload in the digital world (Dias, 2001).  They can be harnessed in various ways to 
increase the productivity of workers as well as increase delivery of managed information 
1 
and services to the public.  For modern enterprises, portals can also be used to provide a 
single gateway to all enterprise information and knowledge resources (Collins, 1999).  
Figure 1 illustrates the main components of a typical portal and how content flows from 
network systems to the end user. 
In her paper on corporate portals, Dias classifies portals in two ways: environment 
and function.  Portals classified according to environment are either public or corporate in 
nature.  Public portals provide a single interface to the immense network of servers that is 
the Internet.  These portals, sometimes known as consumer portals, establish a one-way 
relationship with their patrons and are usually exploited as a new marketing media.  For 
example, they may be used in a manner similar to television, radio or the press for the 
purpose of marketing.  On the other hand, corporate portals provide business-specific 
information in a context that helps users find information needed to face their 
competitors.  This flavor of portal seeks to provide an integrated environment that 
supports information access, delivery, and work-support across organizational 
dimensions.  Figure 2 illustrates the typical knowledge sources for integration within an 
organization.  (Reynolds & Koulopoulos, 1999)    
Portals that are classified according to their function are either collaborative 
processing and/or decision-supportive in nature (Dias, 2001).  Collaborative-processing 
portals use some sort of collaborative communications tool to improve productivity from 
manipulation of information developed by corporate applications, the traditional supply 
chain as well as individuals and groups.  These types of portals go beyond mere “content 
retrieval” to become a powerful device for discussing and sharing business content with 
other users (White, 1999).  In contrast, decision-supportive portals assist managers, 
executives, and analysts to obtain required corporate information for the purpose of 




Figure 2.   Knowledge Sources (From Reynolds & Koulopoulos, 1999) 
 
Portals can also be classified according to industry scope.  These types of portals 
are categorized in two ways: Vertical and Horizontal.  A vertical industry is defined as an 
industry with a relatively narrow range of information and services.  A vortal (vertical 
industry portal) is “a web site that provides a gateway or portal to information related to a 
particular industry such as health care, insurance, automobiles, or food manufacturing 
(SearchEBusiness.com, 2002).”  
Vertical industry portals provide specific narrow-scoped data, information, and 
services through a single user interface.  For example, a web portal dedicated to the real-
estate industry with supporting data, information and services related to real property 
could be considered a vortal.  Vertical industry portals also encompass enterprise 
information portals.  In contrast, a horizontal industry is focused on a wide range of 
information and services.  Horizontal portals provide a wide range of information and 
services in one convenient web interface.  These portals are familiar to most people from 
search engines like Yahoo!, Excite and Alta Vista.  Since many industries tend to 
3 
specialize, they are more often vertical in nature.  Table 1 illustrates these portal type 
classifications. 
 
CLASSIFICATION Environment Function Scope 
Public 9   
Corporate 9   
Collaborative Processing  9  
Decision-Supportive  9  
Collaborative Processing & Decision 
Supportive 
 9  





Horizontal Industry   9 
 
Table 1 Portal Type Classifications 
  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
In this thesis we take the concept of a vertical industry web portal coupled with 
well-established principles of software design and suggest a methodology for the 
development of a secure vortal.  Specifically, we propose a methodology and a security 
architecture that can be used as a framework for the development and deployment of a 
secure vortal.   
Many organizations struggle to find a structured approach to develop and 
implement information assurance within their enterprise information systems.  Some 
researchers believe that effective authentication and intruder detection processes coupled 
with an effective strategy for handling intrusion dynamics can provide adequate 
information assurance (Satti & Garner, 2001).  Other researchers advocate using 
deception as a means of information protection and network defense (Cohen, 1998).  In 
the end, most researchers would agree that information assurance requires a variety of 
methods. 
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Thus, effectively planned information assurance within information systems 
requires a structured approach to security architecture development and implementation.  
This methodology should:  
• Show applicability across a diverse set of information system 
architectures. 
• Provide a methodology for security-requirement analysis, security-policy 
development, and a mechanism to determine where security services are 
provided within the architecture. 
• Be straightforward enough to be understood by customers. 
• Effectively and efficiently facilitate development of integrated security 
architectures for enterprise networks. 
• Facilitate an integrated solution across complex heterogeneous 
information systems. 
• Provide a final product that covers all guidelines, policies and customer 
requirements. 
• Provide the customer with visibility into the process and developed 
solution. 
• Facilitate incorporation of technology upgrades as well as policy and 
guideline revisions. (Lowman & Mosier, 1997) 
Structured methodology for the development of information-system architectures 
should include security architecture.  When a reproducible methodology is used in 
concert with specific standards such as the Joint Technical Architecture, then the required 
guidance is available to develop the necessary security architecture (DoD JTA, 2001).  In 
addition, the implementation of one or more security policies through the use of a defined 
security architecture coupled with a variety of security services provides a reasonable 
layered approach to implementing configurable information assurance within a computer 
network.   
A public network such as the Internet provides a unique environment to 
demonstrate the balance between information assurance and information accessibility.  
Defining a methodology for the development of a vortal possessing adequate information 
assurance provides a framework for future deployment of similar mechanisms that 
provide services to users on a public network like the Internet.  
5 
The primary research question addressed in this thesis is “by what methodology 
should information assurance principles and techniques be applied to support the 
development of a secure vertical web portal?”  In addition, the following questions will 
be considered: 
• How is it possible to prioritize the information assurance mechanism(s) of 
a vertical portal in order to obtain the most optimum secure system 
architecture? 
• Within the context of information assurance, what method(s) should be 
applied in order to determine which security services would provide a 
reasonable level of information assurance while permitting a high level of 
information accessibility? 
The scope of this thesis includes a general review of portals with an emphasis on 
providing a methodology for the development of architecture for a secure vortal for the 
Department of the Navy.  Doctrine and policy with respect to computer support will be 
addressed but will not be developed within this thesis.  But vortal implementation and 
testing are beyond the scope of this thesis and may provide subject matter for follow-on 
thesis work.    
Currently the United States Navy has an organizational entity called Task Force 
Web whose mission is “to provide integrated and transformational information exchange 
for both the ashore and afloat Navy to take full advantage of Navy's IT21 and Navy and 
Marine Corps Intranet infrastructure investments” (Task Force Web, 2000).  Task Force 
Web has the responsibility to oversee the development of the Navy Portal.  This thesis 
can contribute to its mission and benefit all members of the U. S. Navy who use the 
greater Navy Portal and similar portals. 
6 
II. RELATED WORK 
To fulfill the needs of industry and explore a profit area with considerable 
potential, numerous software companies have developed ready-made portal products that 
can be implemented with the addition of content and some minor configuration changes.  
These products are tailor-able to the needs of the customer organization.  The following 
examples illustrate what some companies have fielded as their attempt at a portal 
“solution”1.  
A. AUTONOMY 
Autonomy’s Portal-in-a-Box™ (Autonomy, 2000a) supports automated user 
profiling as well as allows users to use content from various sources through automated 
content aggregation and management on platforms such as Microsoft Windows NT, 
Microsoft Windows 2000, SUN Solaris, LINUX, HP-UX, Java Servlet 
Engine/Application Server, and Standard Web Servers.  This uses Autonomy’s Dynamic 
Reasoning Engine (DRE™), a “unique pattern-recognition technology that automatically 
analyzes information based on its content.”  Through statistically predictable word 
patterns, Autonomy’s DRE™ technology independently represents concepts and 
functions in more than 20 languages.  This allows for automation of “the most critical 
processes including categorization, personalization, hypertext-link management, and 








                                                 
1 The selection of these examples was based on the availability of architectural and security 
information and does not constitute endorsement for these products. 
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Figure 3.   Autonomy Portal Architecture (From Autonomy, 2002) 
 
An Autonomy portal “automatically processes digital content and allows 
enterprise applications to communicate with each other” through the use of a plug-in 
technology called Autonomy Content Infrastructure™ (ACI™).  The ACI™ supports 
open Internet standards like “HTML, SGML, Text files, XML, binary delimited” and 
provides options to support over 200 data formats, audio, and repositories such as 
“Documentum, FileNET, Lotus Notes, Microsoft Exchange, NNTP servers, ODBC, 





Figure 4.   Autonomy Logical Architecture (From Autonomy, 2002) 
 
“Typical security implementations require a combination of secure configurations 
of the front-end (ASPs, CGIs, Desktop applications, etc) and the back-end processes, 
namely the fetches and the DRE™.”  Depending on the security granularity required for 
the system, a typical deployment of Autonomy’s Portal-in-a-Box™ uses a composite 
security architecture which includes secure access, user authentication, user entitlement, 
secure communications, and external secure site access.  Figure 5 displays Autonomy’s 
security architecture. 
Secure access is achieved by capitalizing on the inherent organizational network 
information system’s security architecture provided by firewalls and other network 
device configurations. 
User authentication is achieved through the use of a combination of Autonomy’s 
own internal authentication and other authentication mechanisms such as Windows 2000 
9 
authentication, Light-weight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), other standardized 
application authentication capabilities provided in products such as Lotus Notes or 
Microsoft Exchange as well as available non-standardized authentication mechanisms via 
Autonomy’s application programming interface (API) tools. 
 
Figure 5.   Autonomy Security Architecture (From Autonomy, 2002a) 
 
User entitlements are controlled through the use of “proprietary entitlement 
strategies usually in the form of Access Control Lists (ACLs)” which are present in a 
wide range of content sources and formats.  These entitlement strategies include third-
party repository authorization, database segmentation via user roles, and entitlements 
based on field restrictions.  (Autonomy, 2002a) 
Third-party repository authorizations are content-repository implemented 
mechanisms.  They add flexibility because content access is determined by “operating 
system authentication mechanisms or specific authorization CGIs, ASPs, etc.” at the time 
10 
the user attempts to view the original document.  Their advantage is implementation 
simplicity; their disadvantage is that a user could potentially be shown results they are not 
entitled to view. 
Database segmentation may be done via user roles.  This means that DRE™ 
databases can perform role restriction.  “Users are assigned to one or more roles and 
entitlement information is set for each one by identifying which databases each role is 
allowed to access.”  Since DRE™ databases are information folders that divide the 
knowledge base in a logical manner; the DRE™ receives queries only pertaining to the 
applicable databases to which the user associated role is allowed to view.  Their 
advantage is efficiency in that “unnecessary security processing is removed from the 
DRE™ and is done at the front-end level.”  Their disadvantages are that entitlement is 
enforced at the application front end and anyone with direct access to the DRE™ back-
end could “potentially have access to unauthorized databases.” 
Entitlements based on field restrictions can be used as well.  This means that 
entitlements are determined from restrictions placed on entitlement fields and filtering at 
the document level.  Each document is assigned an entitlement field value at indexing 
time, and this at query time gets compared in some manner with the user’s entitlement 
value to determine access entitlement.  Third-Party Entitlement Implementation (DRE™ 
plug-ins) may be used to restrict user entitlement.  This means “DRE™ security plug-in 
modules ensure that only documents which the user is entitled to see are sent back to the 
requesting application.”  This is implemented through either non-mapped or mapped 
security modes. 
For non-mapped security mode, the DRE™ needs direct connectivity to the data 
repository to use any necessary APIs or plug-ins to obtain access control information.  
Plug-ins are available in the form of shared objects (for UNIX) and Dynamic Link 
Libraries (for Windows NT) “which can be custom built and easily plugged into the 
system.”  For mapped security mode, “the Access Control List (ACL) of the documents 
in the repository is mapped into a structured field in the DRE™.”  To ensure 
confidentiality, structured fields are encrypted.  At the time of indexing, the indexing 
module retrieves each document ACL and stores it in the DRE™.  The DRE™ does not 
11 
require any repository connection.  Figure 6 compares Mapped security mechanisms with 
Non-Mapped security mechanisms. 
 
Figure 6.   Non-Mapped vs. Mapped Security Mechanisms (From Autonomy, 2002a) 
 
Secure communication is achieved through Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption 
over the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP).  External Secure Site Access is achieved 
through the use of Autonomy’s HTTP fetch and can exploit a variety of login and 
authorization methods such as HTTP authentication (username and password), form-
based login using the POST method (HTTP fetch emulation of an HTML authentication 
12 
form), form-based login using the GET method (use of a specified branded Universal 
Resource Locator (URL) for authentication process activation), cookie-based login (using 
cookies to circumvent the login process), NT Login Management (NTLM) security (use 
of Windows NT login security provided at a website), and Client side SSL certificates 
(use of a client side SSL certificate authentication when fetching from a secure site). 
B. BRIO 
 
Figure 7.   Job Factories and Agents manage work (From Brio, 2001) 
 
The Brio Portal™ implementation is a bit different (Brio, 2001).  Using a Java-
based multi-tier architecture; the Brio Portal™ allows real-time performance evaluation 
with personalized metrics, content, and the ability to access both unstructured and 
structured data.  Figure 7 suggests how personalized content “agents” automate 
information discovery and delivery from multiple data sources such as data warehouses, 
web sites and internal file systems.  This affords the opportunity to leverage 
“applications, production and warehouse data as well as unstructured information 
including documents and web content, facilitating simplified, insightful decision-
making.”  To support this design, a series of component controls are used to handle the 
various tasks and services internal to the portal.  
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Using Autonomy’s pattern-matching technology allows the Brio Knowledge 
Server component to search for “content in any language and format, from any location, 
and present it automatically with hyperlinks to similar information” through an active 
client service component WebClient.  The WebClient component controls what users see 
and access through the portal.  A Name Server component is used to manage service-
agent configuration information, authentication, and initialization service as well as 
provide directory lookup.  Session management is provided through a Service Broker that 
acts as a service-agent gateway server and dynamic load balancer to handle user requests.  
An Authentication Service component provides WebClient with client-service 
authentication through an internal authentication driver or an external authentication 
service. 
The Repository manages object storage, search, browsing, or retrieval actions on 
the object repository.  The Job Factory “requests services from external DBMS or 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems and delivers the job output both to the end-
user, through the WebClient, and to the Repository, for future distribution.”  An Event 
Server schedules Job Factory agents as well as provides users with a subscribable 
notification service.  A centralized Administrator manages objects, categories, users, 
schedules, and services.  An Integrator uses a Java Application Program Interface to 
integrate other systems with the Brio Portal.  Security is achieved through profile-driven 
content and object-level access that “integrates with other user-authentication 
mechanisms including NT domains, LDAP, NIS/NIS+ and third party single sign-on 
security.”  Finally, the use of the Wireless Markup Language (WML) supports two-way 












Figure 8.   Portal Architecture-Oracle9iAS (From Oracle, 2002a) 
 
A third portal product is the Oracle9iAS Portal (Oracle, 2002).  It operates from a 
higher perspective than those previously discussed and has the features of open-
architecture interoperability, scalability to meet performance requirements, essential 
application and content integration, a flexible management model to simplify 
administration, and productivity tools for portal creation and maintenance.  Figure 8 
displays the Oracle9iAS Portal architecture.   
The Oracle9iAS Portal architecture supports the integration of remotely hosted 
applications through open Internet standards such as Simple Object Access Protocol 
(SOAP), Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and eXtensible Markup Language 
(XML).  The Portal uses portlets to incorporate the use of Java Server Pages (JSPs), Java 
Servlets, and Enterprise JavaBeans (EJBs) into the portal without the requirement of 
writing additional code.  In addition, portlets provide the ability to integrate proprietary 
15 
technologies like Lotus Notes, Microsoft Exchange and client/server applications.  
Portlets are small-embedded portal components that promote, summarize, or grant access 
to an information resource.  All portlets are role based and are integrated to leverage 
single sign-on for access.  Tools such as Oracle Application Interconnect, Workflow and 
Adapters are used to access, transform and expose higher-level data from third party 
applications such as SAP, PeopleSoft or Siebel into a portlet-ready format.   
For interconnectivity of locally hosted components, the Oracle9iAS Portal uses 
open Internet Standards such as Java 2 Platform Enterprise Edition (J2EE), Web 
Services, JavaScript, XML and other languages.  It also incorporates standards-based 
capabilities that support the Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning 
(WebDAV) protocol, HTTP, and wireless protocols.   
Applications and information sources, denoted as portlets, use an entity called a 
provider to communicate with the portal.  Each portlet has a one-to-one correspondence 
with a provider.  After a provider becomes registered with a portal instance, its 
component portlets become available for placement on a portal page.  Providers may be 
grouped into logical groups regardless of physical location to organize and optimize 
multiple provider registration.  In addition, providers may be accessed in different ways 
within the Oracle9iAS Portal architecture.  The Web Provider may be coded for access 
with the portal in any computing language (Java, C, C++, etc) or it may be accessed 
through referencing and optionally employing an eXtensible Style Language (XSL) 
transformation to the applicable URL or Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 
document.  The Portal Engine and provider communicate via SOAP and HTTP.  This 
allows firewall to isolate remote providers from the portal's middle tier.  To support a 
PL/SQL provider, an adapter receives the SOAP call and then subsequently calls the 
applicable PL/SQL API.  
The Oracle9i Application Server is available on UNIX platforms, including 
Solaris, Linux, HP-UX, AIX, and Compaq Tru64 as well as Windows NT/2000.  It uses 
the Apache Web server as the HTTP server.  In addition, it has a built-in database 
provider that generates MobileXML to respond to mobile requests.  It has an Integration 
component that contains the Oracle Application Interconnect, a product called Workflow, 
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and adapters to existing applications such as PeopleSoft, SAP, MQ Series, Siebel and 
others.  A level of abstraction from application APIs is provided by the Integration server 
and its packaged adapters.  Oracle Workflow (another service provided by the Oracle9i 
Application Server) allows portals to model, automate, and continuously improve 
business practices through defined rules that govern the routing of information within the 
server’s service scope. 
The Oracle9iAS Portal Development Kit (PDK) allows developers to build 
portlets to handle customer-specific applications or content as well as enforce security 
with a single-login feature.  In addition, developers can capitalize on provider and portlet 
API-level services for development convenience.  To support rapid portal development, 
the Oracle9iAS Portal uses “an easy to use browser-based, wizard-driven, declarative 
interface” that enables the portal creator to create most of the portal if not all of it.  The 
Oracle9iAS Portal contains page design and development features that “give 
administrators, page designers, and end users a powerful environment in which to create 
content rich, secure, portal pages” without any required programming.  Page content may 
have both portlets and content items.  Page templates provide a mechanism to enforce 
predefined page layout, style, and security settings for portal content.  Pages are 
organized within page groups.  These groups may be used to “create ad hoc or carefully 
controlled content taxonomies.”   
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A basic component of a Portal page is a content item.  Oracle9iAS Portal items 
are rooted within their item type and may only be created by users with appropriate 
privileges.  Item types define content and attribute information.  These attributes are 
custom fields that contain additional item or page data.  Policies for content types, type 
attributes, and page management within a page group are set by Portal administrators.  
File-type item content may be published via the Web-based Distributed Authoring and 
Versioning (WebDAV) protocol to the portal repository.  Portal page groups may be 
mapped as Web Folders using a WebDAV client like Windows Explorer.  The 
Oracle9iAS Portal uses a highly tuned, multi-threaded servlet engine to do parallel 
processing of portlet content retrieval, cache management, and portal-page assembly and 
delivery.  Portal administration, development, and end-user functions are accessed via a 
portlet.  The underlying architecture uses a fully integrated, intelligent cache to enable 
high levels of performance and minimize unnecessary page and content regeneration.  In 
addition to this, the architecture supports “load distribution and parallel execution of 
portal components across multiple servers.”   
The Oracle9iAS Portal uses an integrated security infrastructure to “authenticate 
users, support single sign on (SSO), and manage users/user group information.”  All users 
are authenticated through the use of Oracle9iAS SSO.  With SSO support, users need 
only login to the Oracle9i Application Server once to obtain access to any SSO-enabled 
application that they are authorized.  To support the underlying security infrastructure, 
Oracle9iAS SSO is completely integrated with the Oracle Internet Directory (OID).  The 
OID is the repository for Oracle9iAS Portal's user and group definitions. User 
administration is achieved through user management screens in the Oracle9iAS Portal, or 
through the OID provided APIs and administrative tools.  The OID can synchronize with 
LDAP directories using built-in meta-directory capabilities.  For finer granularity of 
control, user and group privileges on portal objects (pages, styles, items, portlets, etc.) are 
managed through access control lists (ACL’s).  With ACLs, responsibility can be 
delegated by administrators to object owners, who then can specify users/groups and their 
object privileges.  This enables administrators to grant global privileges to all objects of a 
particular type.  In addition, the portal can be configured to provide Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) connectivity with users and remote portlet providers.    
Oracle addresses the issue of shared versus dedicated databases through its virtual 
private database.  The Virtual Private Database (VPD) includes application context and 
finely-granular access control.  With VPD, access policies for individuals or groups can 
be defined within the context of the organization to which they belong.  Access can be 
accomplished by providing authentication information either directly or indirectly 
through a branded Universal Resource Locator (URL).  Branded URLs switch the access 
context to the appropriate subscriber by pointing to a specifically correlated URL linked 
to the host portal “so that users need only provide their username and password to login.”  






Figure 9.   Plumtree Portal Architecture (From Plumtree, 2002) 
 
The Plumtree Corporate Portal (Plumtree, 2002) incorporates heterogeneous 
applications, security, and content search as Web services by communications between 
software components and a parallel engine.  This infrastructure relies on the Simple 
Object Access Protocol (SOAP) Web services standard which sends embedded 
programming commands in an XML text message through HTTP to Web services.  
SOAP was designed for programmatic interaction between Web service components via 
a programming interface.  This enables the assimilation of different resources as well as 
scalability for increased user populations.  Figure 9 displays the Plumtree Corporate 
Portal architecture. 
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Plumtree’s Web Services Architecture for integrating heterogeneous technologies 
in a portal is flexible enough to enable Web services to be “installed anywhere on a wide 
area network, on any platform, using any programming language to communicate with 
other systems.”  Through the appropriate SOAP implementation and any programming 
language, developers can create Web services or applications that use them.  This means 
that different environments and networks may be used to create and operate Web services 
and clients while still supporting interoperability and common communications over 
HTTP and SOAP.  Service flexibility is essential to almost any size portal deployment.  
Because Web services are modular, the integration and interoperability of portal 
components provided by different vendors is possible.  The problems with integrating 
portal components provided by different vendors have not been with the connectivity 
between components but with the content of the messages.  
The Plumtree Corporate Portal depends on Web services to perform all functions 
that communicate with portal-incorporated systems.  This allows the extension of core 
portal server software without redevelopment.  It enables an organization to add new 
applications, index new content, authenticate new users, and search new repositories by 
developing and registering these new modules as Web services.  Authentication, 
searching and indexing Web services receive commands as SOAP messages from the 
portal server.  Subsequently, they provide the appropriate response to the portal server.  
Gadget Web Services, on the other hand, handle user interactions through a user 
interface.  The portal server only sends the user’s initial request to the Gadget Web 
Service which resides on the gadget server.  This request includes user or group identity 
and preferred configuration information to personalize the Gadget Web Service for that 
user or group.  The Gadget Web Service functions respond to user requests provided 
through the gadget’s user interface; no further commands from the portal server are 
provided.  It is important to note that Gadget Web Services are more like “modular Web 
applications that the portal service can combine in a portal experience.”   
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Each Gadget Web Service can have separate preferences tied to a separate portal-
registered interface for configuring them.  Because the HTTP header delivers user 
preferences, preferences are more quickly processed than SOAP message commands.  
This is an advantage because gadgets dynamically incorporate several applications in a 
single user session.  For example, a simple Gadget Web Service providing a calendar 
display may call components for authentication, calendar display, and new appointment 
creation, among others.  Providing components as Web services enables the Gadget Web 
Service to use them and simplify gadget development.  However, significant effort is 
required to build them. 
The Plumtree Corporate Portal solution uses a parallel portal engine to improve 
performance and integrate resources using accepted Internet standards such as HTTP, 
SOAP, and XML.  The parallel portal engine operates within an application server and 
uses the Plumtree HTTP library to issue multiple simultaneous HTTP requests.  These 
requests are handled through one computing thread in a single “virtual request” to many 
Web services.  This reduces the number of network sockets opened and closed and allows 
load balancing against multiple instances of a Web service by redirecting requests when 
the service is overtaxed or fails.  To further increase processing speed, the addresses of 
computers hosting portal web services are cached in memory by the parallel engine.  In 
addition, the parallel engine supports a secure socket layer (SSL) implementation that is 
“optimized for secure connections to thousands of Web services.”  
The Plumtree Corporate Portal provides flexible authentication, granular access 
control, and adaptability to host systems with diverse security schemes.  Authentication 
in the Plumtree solution is achieved through its own master user directory (password-
based authentication) or through the use of external services that enable a single sign-on 
to multiple network systems.  The Plumtree Corporate Portal creates a master directory of 
users that includes any group affiliations from external services.  Within the context of 
the master directory are user-associated profiles with “portal-specific privileges and 
personalization preferences.”  This master directory of users and groups acts as a master 
access control system for all Plumtree Portal links.  Consequently, the master user 




Figure 10.   Plumtree Password-Based Authentication (From Plumtree, 2000) 
 
Figure 10 displays the typical password-based authentication for the Plumtree 
Corporate Portal.  All Plumtree users have an account whose information is encrypted in 
Plumtree’s back-end database.  Users access a Plumtree Web page and type in their user 
name and password.  The login is authenticated against the master user directory 
database.  When properly authenticated, users enter the portal possessing.  “Security 
permissions as defined entirely within Plumtree’s user database.”  
Figure 11 illustrates how the portal authenticates users with an external directory 
service to process the authentication.  To ensure that access control updates are received 
quickly, the Plumtree master user directory database is periodically synchronized with 
appropriate external directory services.  When databases differ, user and group 





Figure 11.   Authentication by External Directory Service (Plumtree, 2000) 
 
Plumtree supports secure client authentication as well as single sign-on to 
multiple applications through network authentication standards such as Kerberos and 
X.509 v3 digital certificates.  Kerberos authentication uses secret-key cryptography and 
is based on the idea of tickets, “encrypted data packets verifying a user’s identity that are 
issued by a trusted authority called a Key Distribution Center (KDC).”  During a typical 
Kerberos experience, a user opens a Plumtree web page and performs the standard log-in 
procedures.  The user is authenticated by the Kerberos KDC.  Once properly 
authenticated, the KDC provides an initial Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT).  When the user 
navigates through the portal to a network resource that requires user authentication for 
access, the session presents the TGT to the Key Distribution Center and requests the 
issuance of a Service Ticket (ST).  The user’s session presents the ST to the network 
resource and is granted the appropriate user access. 
X.509 is a standard for defining digital certificates which enable Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) based authentication.  PKI uses public and private cryptographic 
keys to authenticate a user.  These keys are “mathematically related, yet impossible to 
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deduce from one another.”  Under PKI, a trusted service called a Certificate Authority 
(CA) is used to verify user identity and manage digital certificates (user credentials).  
During a typical PKI transaction, a user opens a Plumtree web page and performs the 
standard log-in procedure.  The Plumtree server generates an encoded certificate request 
to the CA using the user’s private key.  When the CA receives the user’s certificate 
request, it extracts the user’s name and authenticates the user’s request by decrypting the 
transmitted certificate request using the user’s public key.  When the certificate request is 
authenticated successfully, the CA will issue a certificate associated with that user to the 
Plumtree server.  The user’s certificate is proof of user authentication for that particular 
session.  When the user navigates through the portal to a network resource that requires 
user authentication for access, the certificate is presented and the appropriate user access 
is granted.  
The Plumtree Corporate Portal uses a role-based security model and user groups 
to provide access control.  All users are members of at least one group, and each group is 
related to a role.  Each system object has an access-control list (ACL) that determines 
user privileges for the object.  The Portal supports three user roles and up to three 
privileges for each system object.  A combination of privileges, roles, and groups 
determines user access and rights.  
Table 2 summarizes user roles and the specific privileges they may exercise 
according to a particular system object.  Administrators or Content Managers can change 
group privileges; however, by default certain roles assume specific privileges.  Groups 
can have different privileges in different parts of the portal.  This is the key to Plumtree’s 
granularity of access control.  For example, a supply expert may be a Content Manager in 




Content Managers Content Maintainers Browsing Users
Links
Read Only: Can see the link  
Read/Write:  Can see the link 
and modify any of its properties
Read Only:  Can see the link      
Read/Write:  Can modify the 
link's name and description
Read Only:  Can see the link      
Read/Write:  Can see the link
Folders
Read Only:  Can browse the 
folder                              
Read/Write:  Can submit, move 
and remove links, move, delete, 
or modify the folder                      
Read/Write/Approve:  Can add 
and remove links, and approve 
links submitted by users or 
imported by crawlers
Read Only:  Can browse the 
folder                                  
Read/Write:  Can submit, move 
and remove links, move or 
delete folder                 
Read/Write/Approve:  Can add 
and remove links, and approve 
links submitted by users or 
imported by crawlers
Read:  Can browse the folder      
Read/Write:  Can submit links 
to the folder, pending approval    
Read/Write/Approve:  Can 
submit pre-approved links into 
the folder
Publications
Read Only:  Can see the 
publication                      
Read/Write:  Can modify or 
delete the publication and 
approve its issues
Read Only:  Can subscribe to 
the publication over the W eb       
Read/Write:  Can approve 
issues of the publication
Read Only:  Can subscribe to 
the publication over the W eb       
Read/Write: Can subscribe to 
the publication over the W eb
Gadgets
Read Only:  Can use the 
Gadget and personalize it where 
applicable                           
Read/Write:  Can modify or 
delete the Gadget
Read Only:  Can use the 
Gadget, and personalize it 
where applicable             
Read/Write:  Can use the 
Gadget, and personalize it 
where applicable
Read Only:  Can use the 
Gadget, and personalize it 
where applicable          
Read/Write:  Can use the 
Gadget, and personalize it 
where applicable
Data Sources
Read Only:  Can see and crawl 
the data source, and create links 
to information in the data source  
Read/Write:  Can modify or 
delete the data source
Read Only:  Can submit links to 
information in the data source
Read Only:  Can submit links to 
information in the data source
Properties
Read Only:  Can see the 
property's values                          
Read/Write:  Can modify the 
property's values or delete it
Read Only:  Can see the 
property's values
Read Only:  Can see the 
property's values
User Groups
Read Only:  Can see the user 
group                                      




Read Only:  Can see the 
crawler                            




Read Only:  Can see the 
document type                             
Read/Write:  Can modify or 
delete the document type
N/A N/A
Jobs
Read Only:  Can see the job  
Read/Write:  Can add or 
remove operations, modify the 
job's schedule, or delete the job.
N/A N/A
 
Table 2 Default User Roles and Privileges to Objects (From Plumtree, 2000) 
 
The Plumtree Corporate Portal uses portal-object ACLs for widespread extended 
enterprise deployment of the portal to users with varied security profiles.  The portal 
recognizes four different objects: Links, Folders, Gadgets, and Publications.  Plumtree 
defines a link as an indexed content directory element that points to external information.  
Folders are defined as content directory elements that contain links.  Gadgets are portal-
embedded applications or services.  Publications are personalized page-embedded content 
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directory queries or queries received via email.  All of these objects are secured with an 
ACL.  This means that if a user does not appear within an object’s ACL or is not a 
member of one of the groups listed within the ACL, the user cannot see the object nor 
search for the object.  Finally, if the user does not have the appropriate document access 
in its native environment, then it will also not be accessible through the portal.  Figure 12 
summarizes the four access control checks for portal objects. 
 
Figure 12.   Four Access Control Check Points (From Plumtree, 2000). 
 
Plumtree’s Corporate Portal can work with the security schemes of numerous 
hosts.  This allows the portal to act as a conduit or gateway for information and 
applications from disparate systems.  To support this effort Plumtree crawlers “catalog 
information from host systems” and Plumtree gadgets “embed Web application modules 
that require authentication with a host.”  This results in the portal managing multiple 
authentication settings to ensure that information is only received by its authorized 
intended recipients.  
Plumtree uses a content directory that is created from information from several 
host systems, namely databases, file systems and web sites.  To create this content 
directory, the portal must access and link disparate original data sources.  Often these 
data sources use differing methods to manage objects and users.  This creates a challenge 
for integration.  To address this Plumtree employs a three-layered security scheme to 
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“empower Content Managers to access the resources necessary to create a comprehensive 
portal.”  Content Managers can: 
• Provide each crawler with a particular security profile.  This limits the 
crawler to only the authorized information on the host system. 
• Instruct crawlers to stamp any created links with Plumtree ACLs 
corresponding to the profile used to access the information. 
• Prevent other Content Managers from using or editing their crawlers.  
In addition, Administrators and Content Managers can configure the Portal Server 
to operate as “different users when polling different data sources for information.”  This 
allows the portal to manage information links that reference original data while it remains 
in its “native platform, safeguarded by its native security system.”  Since the format for 
ACLs may vary between systems, the portal does not import host system ACLs.  Instead, 
Administrators and Content Managers are able to configure individual crawlers to stamp 
links with a Plumtree security profile that matches the “security profile used to access the 
host system.”  This provides the foundation for the accessibility of disparate objects that 
are embedded as portal content. 
Merging big applications into a portal page at user discretion challenges 
enterprise security infrastructure in two ways: Who can access which modules, and how 
do disparate modules authenticate in the context of their host systems?  Through the use 
of common ACLs associated with each application module, Plumtree Administrators and 
Content Managers can control which gadgets may be embedded into personalized pages 
and by whom.  Different functionality provided by a gadget can be managed with 
different ACLs.  For example, a budget gadget from a database management service may 
be restricted to personnel who deal with budgets, while an equipment-inventory gadget 
can be made available to everyone in the supply department.  
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Table 3 Crawlers Used To Import Increasingly Sensitive Information From A Host 
System. (From Plumtree, 2000) 
 
It is important to note that gadget ACLs do not provide a mechanism to conduct 
authentication between the host system and the gadget.  Plumtree handles this by 
capturing “users’ authentication information for each embedded application or service” 
and maintaining this information as encrypted entries in its user database.  This provides 
users access to important parts of embedded applications without the need for separate 
authentication. 
Some Web-based application use persistent “cookies” to provide users with 
personalized information every time they visit a site.  This creates an impediment for 
systems that rely on servers to extract information from that Web site as a persistent 
cookie is expected to be with the client.  Plumtree manages cookies on the server.  This 
allows the server to pass the appropriate cookie to the external Web site, obtain the 
appropriate information, and assemble it on the user’s tailored portal web page.    
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E. RELATED RESEARCH 
Designing security into information technology from the onset of the project is 
not a novel concept as evidenced from the above commercial portal examples.  Most 
information assurance experts will agree that designing and implementing security 
mechanisms and processes at the onset of an information technology project is the best 
way to proceed.  In the case of vortals, many design teams assume that they can design 
security into their vortal solution through a thorough threat analysis.  Subsequently they 
use this information to develop specific system requirements.   
Although this may provide a great deal of information concerning the existing 
threats and vulnerabilities, what happens when the vortal persists over a period of time 
and faces new threats?  Will a threat analysis be conducted for every small system 
change?  Who will make the decision to conduct these threat analyses and by what 
criteria will these decisions be made?  The design approach and implementation can 
frequently provide a clear engineering direction.  Some related work in the field of 
research has produced unique approaches that can be considered in the design 
methodology. 
Grupa gives guidelines for forming information-security policies and survival 
strategies in a dynamic and hostile business environment (Grupa, 2001).  He examined an 
artificial economy within a synthetic environment and ran simulations to test and evaluate 
strategies to counter threats.  This research was for online financial services provided by 
organizations such as banks.  It tests security policy implementations by having human 
actors select security policy configurations and try simulations to test these 
configurations. 
McDermott and Fox describe a method which is a variation of Universal 
Modeling Language (UML) Use Cases, for the purpose of developing security 
requirements of an information-technology system in a simple way (McDermott and Fox, 
1999).  Through the use of an “Abuse” case, in which a use case is adapted to capture and 
analyze security requirements, McDermott and Fox can provide a more detailed 
description (resources, skills, and objectives) of the actors within a specific use case 
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scenario while avoiding mathematical security models.  Thus they make security 
requirements easier to understand.   
Brewer describes lessons from large-scale service providers in the form of a 
framework for the development of high availability, evolution, and growth within web 
portals and Internet service providers such as AOL, Microsoft Network, and Yahoo 
(Brewer, 2001).  The conclusions presented take the form of principles and recommended 
approaches rather than a quantitative analysis of methodologies for the development of 
high availability, evolution, and growth. 
Kargl describes a means of preventing distributed denial-of-service attacks to 
Web sites based on a class based routing mechanism in the Linux kernel rather than on 
tight security policy and third-party software and hardware mechanisms (Kargl 2001).  
He provides a scenario, defines denial-of-service and distributed denial-of-service 
attacks, classifies the defined attacks, and discusses a recommended Linux kernel 
solution to prevent these types of attacks. 
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III. ANATOMY OF A VORTAL 
A vortal is similar to a personal computer operating system with a graphical user 
interface (“GUI”).  Many popular operating systems such as Redhat Linux®, Sun 
Solaris®, and Microsoft Windows® use a graphical user interface (Machiraju, 1996).  
Operating systems are software packages that provide an abstract mechanism to manage 
and present services and functions necessary to manipulate data, software applications, 
and services provided by an information system.  They are software applications that 
manage the overall computer resources and services by acting as an intermediary between 
the user and the computer hardware (Silberschatz and Galvin, 2001).  Similarly, vortals 
act as intermediaries between the user and required resources and services.  In fact, 
vortals act as management packages configured to provide, in a graphical manner, the 
required functionality and capabilities of various resources and services in a network of 
computing resources. 
A. THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
Typically, the information environment with which a vortal user must navigate is 
hybrid in nature.  Hybrid means that it presents a range of heterogeneous information 
services in an integrated and consistent manner.  Service provision variations allow 
disparate service and business models to exist within such environments.  Additionally, 
they support “some or all of the following functions: discovery, location, request, 
delivery and use, regardless of the domain in which objects are held” (Russell, 1999). 
Good hybrid information environments feature transparency to the user as well as 
flexibility and scalability.  Transparency requires the environment to depend on 
underlying protocols, software, and systems.  It should permit the inclusion of new 
components as new requirements emerge and as new standards develop.  Open-standards 
“pluggable” components that can seamlessly interface with others facilitate “services for 
discovery, location, request, delivery, and use.”  In addition, good hybrid environments 
should ensure services to be provided in a consistent manner across multiple domains 
irrespective of medium, and should be conducive to growth in “both service provision 
and in volume of traffic.” 
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Consistent management of the hybrid information environment requires an 
organizational and technical framework for which systems and data providers as well as   
information and statistics as well as obtaining components and setting standards for 
interoperability.  Environment management should not require significant expertise and 
resources.  Additionally, the environment should handle both trusted and untrusted users 
and resources, and should support authentication and configurable access for everything 
in the environment. 
B. ABSTRACT MODEL 
Typically, an abstract model describes architectural objectives.  We use the 
MODEL Information Architecture (MIA) (Gardner, 1999).   
 
Figure 13.   Five Layer MIA (From Gardner, 1999) 
 
Figure 13 illustrates the five-layer approach of the MIA.  This achieves simplicity 
while supporting complex functionality: Each layer can have its own abstractions and 
purposes.  The central Mediator layer registers the various services offered but not their 
implementation differences.  The Communicator layer provides the Mediator with 
standardized access to the offered services.  The Coordinator layer “tailors the 
information landscape for a particular user community.”  The Presenter layer 
communicates with users (people or software agents) to ensure that multiple interfaces 
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can be supplied to the same Coordinator.  Finally, the Provider layer contains the external 
services provided to the environment. 
 
Figure 14.   Presenter Layer (From Gardner, 1999) 
 
Figure 14 displays the Presenter layer that manages user interaction.  Typically, 
user interaction involves a GUI or a network protocol.  For example, user input submitted 
via a web form is encoded and passed to the presentation logic.  If the input can be 
handled within the presenter layer (e.g. change of display options) then it is passed to the 
output generator which updates the display.  If the input cannot be handled locally (e.g. a 
search request), the input is passed to the Coordinator layer and then to the Presenter for 
display update.  This enables the Coordinator to focus on application issues independent 
of the manner in which a system is accessed. 
The Coordinator layer provides an abstract layer for handling applications.  It is 
responsible for managing the “user landscape” and for protecting the Mediator layer from 
“user-specific and context-specific issues.”  Figure 15 displays the Coordinator layer.  
The User Profile and Session Control contextualize the request.  If the request can be 
handled within the Coordinator layer it is resolved (e.g. current query’s next series of 
results).  More often, these requests will be passed to the Mediator layer whose result will 
also be contextualized (e.g. select the current file or database record). 
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Figure 15.   Coordinator Layer (From Gardner, 1999) 
 
The Mediator layer provides an abstraction layer between the coordinator and any 
“brokered services.”  The Mediator provides united services “based on multiple 
individual services.”  Figure 16 displays it.  The Request Server receives a Coordinator 
request and determines the request response.  If it is a complex request then it may be 
subdivided into multiple sub-requests.  Each sub-request is correlated to a particular 
service as determined by the Request Server.  Forward Knowledge assesses whether the 
services will respond positively and provides that information to the Request Server.  
Subsequently, the Request Server makes multiple sub-requests to services over the 
Communication layer.  Results are combined and provided to the Coordinator. 
 
Figure 16.   Mediator Layer (From Gardner, 1999) 
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Figure 17 displays the Communicator layer that manages communication with 
external services.  The Communicator receives multiple requests from the Mediator.  
These requests are executed in parallel and the results are returned to the Mediator when 
available.  Requests are translated into the proper format based on the Network Service 
Profile of the target service.  The request, including service location, is provided to the 
Protocol Gateway module for further transfer to the appropriate service.  In the reverse 
direction, when results are received they are translated into a “standard format and 
vocabulary” for further processing by Mediator. 
 
Figure 17.   Communicator Layer (From Gardner, 1999) 
 
The Provider layer contains services accessed by the system and brokered across 
the hybrid Information Environment.  Each Provider is described by a Network Service 
Profile. 
C. MODEL APPLICATION 
The MIA can be applied to the architecture of a vortal.  Figure 18 displays a 
simple vortal architecture that is broken out using MIA layers.  But a real vortal would 
have more end users and more Provider layer components.   
In general, end users (human or intelligent agents) interact with Presenter 
components.  Each Presenter component supplies the server side of an application 
protocol (e.g. XML, HTTP, HTTP(S) and SOAP) and handles end-user input and output.  
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Core application logic components within the Coordinator layer interact with the 
Mediator layer to obtain end-user authentication, personal profiles, tailored display 
settings, and build the “user landscape” (Powell, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 18.   Simple Vortal Architecture (Adapted From Powell, 2000) 
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For example, to authenticate an end user, components within the Coordinator 
layer request authentication from the Mediator layer.  The generic Authenticate 
component within the Mediator layer passes the request to the Mediate component which 
calls on the Get Collection/Service Description component to query the availability of 
authentication services.  The results of the query determine the protocol-specific 
components within the Communicator layer to be used.  The protocol-specific 
components communicate with the Get Network Service Profile to determine the specific 
protocol details (port, attributes, etc.) for the desired Provider layer component. 
Provisions in the architecture allow for end users to communicate directly with 
end collections and services as necessary.  In addition, vortals can be chained so one 
vortal can act as the intelligent end user for another vortal. 
D. FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS 
If the software that drives a vortal cannot be trusted to adequately provide 
required capabilities in a reasonably secure manner, then the vortal does not add true 
value to the organization.  In effect, it may even become a liability to the organization by 
creating risks and exploitable vulnerabilities that greatly exceed the benefits (McGraw, 
2002).  So its security features are important.  To do this, an effective vortal should try to 
provide capabilities through simple modular components and open-standard 
communication protocols.  These components should be created from what is necessary 
and sufficient to realize the required capabilities of the vortal (McGraw, 1998).  In 
addition to proper design, configuration control and use based on clearly defined security 
policy are needed for good security practice.  These significantly reduce the likelihood of 
unintended functionality as well as increase reliability. 
So development of a secure vortal requires good software engineering practice.  
The design of responsibly secure software should follow ten principles (McGraw and 
Viega, 2002): 
• Secure the weakest link 
• Practice defense in depth 
• Fail securely 
• Follow the principle of least privilege 
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• Compartmentalize 
• Keep it simple 
• Promote privacy 
• Remember that hiding secrets is hard 
• Be reluctant to trust 
• Use your community resources 
 
 
Figure 19.   Basic Portal Architecture (From White, 2001) 
 
Figure 19 shows a classic portal design which can be used for vortals.  There are 
six functional components of a vortal: presentation services, core management system, 
transmission system, data and content, hardware, and additional supporting services.  
Each of these components could be assigned to a design team. 
1. Presentation Services [Presenter Layer] 
The vortal interface refers to the elements on the computer display screen, which 
allow the user to interact with the system.  Because a vortal can be presented to a user in 
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many different ways, measures of effectiveness should be defined for each vortal 
interface (Hewett, 1992).  The target audience for the vortal will prefer mechanisms 
which more successfully satisfy their needs.  Therefore, development should follow good 
engineering practice with respect to human-computer interaction (HCI).  Figures 20 and 
21 summarize HCI development. 
 




Figure 21.   Human-Computer Interaction Process (From Hewett, 1992) 
 
2. Core Management System [Coordinator and Mediator Layers] 
The vortal core management system (CMS) is another important component.  It 
includes both management components such as the Core Application Logic and software 
components.  It is possible to use hardware with embedded firmware for components in 
the Mediator layer.  The CMS manages the vortal HCI (“user landscape”) and mediates 
requests for vortal resources (Russell, 1999).  
Decisions to utilize a prepackaged software product or to develop the CMS should 
depend on both a thorough cost-benefit analysis and the requirements of the vortal.  If the 
value of the content of the vortal is low and the requirements of the vortal are not great, 
then it may be more cost-effective to use a configurable prepackaged CMS that meets 
vortal requirements rather than hire a team of programmers to create a tailored CMS.  
Keep in mind that there are hidden costs beyond the cost of the vortal content.  For 
example, consideration must be given to the costs associated with CMS compromise.  
Will CMS compromise result in access to a network containing organizationally sensitive 
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resources?  What are the costs associated with the compromise of any network resources 
that may be accessed through a compromised CMS? 
If the most economical approach would be to hire a team of programmers, then it 
is important to conduct a risk assessment, including threat and vulnerability analyses.  It 
may be worthwhile to develop common criteria profiles to assist in the development of 
the CMS.  These analyses can potentially identify critical discrepancies within the design 
and implementation of the CMS, and possibly other areas of the vortal, which may go 
unnoticed during design and implementation.  The programmers should also have a good 
understanding of the organization’s functions and practices to develop context for the 
vortal, and should be required to follow good software engineering practices. 
3. Low Level Communications System [Communicator Layer] 
The Low Level Communications System is the mechanism for parallel 
management of mediated requests, and it handles protocols and the metadata vocabulary.  
It provides information sharing and management and a mechanism to link the vortal data 
and content together.  A standardized conduit for communications, based on open 
standards, is necessary for interoperability in general (Plumtree, 2000). 
4. Content [Provider Layer] 
The content of a vortal is the databases, software applications, and other 
structured and unstructured data files associated with it.  Vortals use resources made 
available through the core management system.  Well-designed and implemented 
database applications can improve the productivity and value of a vortal (Castano, 1995).  
For example, a poorly designed database application may be unable to fully and 
consistently extract all valid data from the database for a simple query, or just may be too 
slow.  Web applications are another important part of a vortal’s content.  They increase 
the content value of a vortal and increase the collaboration, integration, aggregation and 
consolidation of data, information and services available through the vortal. 
5. Hardware 
Hardware is another significant part of a vortal.  It includes workstations, and 
machines that function as web servers, application servers, Structured Query Language 
(SQL) servers, and file and data servers.  Hardware also encompasses the routers, 
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switches, hubs, bridges, gateways, and modems.  Hardware should comply with 
organizational standards and operating policies (e.g. U.S. Navy’s IT21 standard). 
6. Additional Supporting Services 
Besides the five parts of a vortal, it is necessary to consider administrative 
training requirements for system-maintenance personnel and configuration management 
of the elements of the vortal.  Configuration management controls how new components 
are added and old components are removed.  We must also consider administration and 
management of the vortal information environment, and the lifecycle management of the 
overall vortal system. 
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IV. SECURE VORTAL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter provides an overview of the development process for a vortal.  
Figure 22 provides a diagram.  We assume, consistent with the discussion in the last 
chapter: 
• Security within the design, development, and maintenance of software is a 
high priority for senior management (McGraw and Viega, 2002). 
• Architecture should embody applicable security policies (Department of 
Defense, 2001). 
• The design and maintenance of software must follow good software 
engineering, information assurance, and network administrative practices 
(McGraw, 1998). 
• The objectives of the software are specified by the target audience, 
organizational policies, and the mission of the organization (Department 
of Defense, 2001). 
• Vortal content changes as the needs of the target audience, organizational 
policies, and organizational mission changes (Collins, 2001).   
A. CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
Vortal concept development is the first step toward development of a vortal.  
Concept development can use information from three topic areas: high-level policy and 
doctrine, organizational mission and policies, and user input.   
1. Higher Policy and Doctrine 
Higher policy and doctrine provide a mechanism from which overarching 
organizational requirements and high level concept boundaries are developed.  And 
during their review, it may be possible to identify inadequacies within the policy and 

















































































































2.  Organizational Policies and Mission 
The organizational mission and organizational policies are derived from higher 
policy, and doctrine.  They provide specific organizational level guidance for the vortal 
concept development.  In addition, organizational policies can be used to refine the vortal 
goal.  The organizational mission defines centers of concentration for the organization 
and provides necessary organizational focus.  The vortal goal is defined with these 
boundaries and derived from these specific objectives. 
In addition, the organizational mission and organizational policies provide 
specific input for the development of limiting organizational requirements.  These 
limiting requirements can be further refined to form specific organizational information 
system (ORIS) requirements that are necessary to perform the organizational mission.    
3. User Input 
User input provides direct, specific contributions that are necessary for the 
development of the overall vortal concept and subsequent vortal goal.  When user inputs 
are combined with derivatives from the organizational mission and policies, specific 
requirements can be formed.  These requirements may be used to further refine the limits 
and purpose of the vortal.  
User input should reflect a reasonable target-audience sampling and should be 
analyzed to determine that which supports the organizational mission and applicable 
policies.  Inputs outside the organizational mission or applicable policies may have worth 
and should be considered in developing possible changes to the vortal goal.  The vortal 
goal should adequately consider extraordinary cases that often help to define unique 
limiting objectives.  Extraordinary cases may lead to “cutting edge” requirements which 
can help to keep the vortal goal up-to-date and push the vortal to the positive limits of its 
ability to support the mission and higher policy.  Finally, it is also important to note that 
user input can have not only an impact on vortal goal requirements but also 





B. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT   
Requirements are essential in the development of a vortal.  They codify 
limitations and set boundaries for vortal development.  In addition, they assist in the 
development of explicit vortal needs and capabilities.  Further, they provide guidance 
throughout the development process, which helps to maintain focus in the development 
of a vortal.  Figure 23 graphically illustrates the relationships between components in 












Figure 23.   Component Relationships within Vortal Requirements and Security Policy 
Development 
 
The vortal goal defines what the vortal provides, who it represents, and for whom 
the vortal provides its content.  In addition, the vortal goal helps to determine the vortal’s 
security and other types of requirements, which in turn, directly influence the vortal 
architecture and content management.  Vortal requirements, derived from the vortal goal 
and the organizational security policy, codify functional and performance needs of the 
vortal.  
The organizational security policy is derived from organizational requirements 
and shapes the development of vortal security policy.  Organizational requirements are 
derived from higher policy and doctrine as well as organizational policies and the 
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organization’s mission.  Functional and performance requirements provide the foundation 
for organizational security policy and information-system architecture. 
1. Organizational Requirements 
Organizational requirements provide the framework from which organization-
wide information system architecture may be developed.  They are derived from the 
combined inputs of higher policy, doctrine, organizational policies, and the 
organization’s mission.  From organizational requirements, the information-processing, 
transmission, communications and hardware requirements that are necessary to support 
the organization’s mission objectives may be determined.  They also provide the 
foundation for the development of organizational security policy. 
2. Organizational Security Policy 
Organizational security policy codifies guidance for organizational security 
requirements.  It is developed within the constraints of overall organizational 
requirements and is based on threats to the mission and the objectives derived from the 
mission.  It provides a general guidance mechanism to ensure that the basic tenets of 
information assurance are emphasized: “protection from unauthorized or accidental 
modification, destruction, and disclosure and ensure timely availability and usability of 
those data (Kabay, 1996).”  It provides overarching guidance for the development of 
specific vortal security policy.  The development of organizational security policy 
follows these steps: 
• Preliminary evaluation identifying applicable organizational resources to 
be protected; 
• Management sensitization obtaining approval for an organization-wide 
audit and policy formulation project; 
• A needs or risk analysis analyzing the risks to the resources you strive to 
protect; 
• Construction of policies and procedures that meet the identified needs; 
• Implementation (any transformation requires education and may require 
changes in behavior; it should start at the top with management support); 
and 
• Maintenance by creating and maintaining security awareness through daily 
awareness in the work environment as well as an annual security 
agreement). (Kabay, 1996)  
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3. Vortal Goal Definition 
Why do we need a vortal goal definition?  This may seem to be a trivial question; 
however, quite often the development of the answer can be instructive.  Every vortal must 
justify the dedication of resources; it must possess a purpose characterized through the 
vortal goal.   
Figure 24 illustrates the component parts of a vortal goal.  The measurement of 
the vortal’s value is predicated on knowing what applications and services the vortal is 
intended to provide and how effective they were provided.  This is accomplished by 







Figure 24.   Vortal Goal Components 
 
Within the context of vortal development, the term “goal” has a specific purpose 
and meaning.  It describes what the intended vortal is designed to do; it identifies the 
beneficiaries; and it provides guidance for the management of data, information, and 
48 
services which are available through the vortal.  It is primarily used to orient the efforts 
and actions of the vortal design team.   
A vortal design team may have most of the vortal goal definition dictated by 
higher policy, doctrine, or some other formal document.  However, if the dictated portion 
is not too specific then the design team must obtain further guidance from their higher 
organization.  In some cases, the vortal goal may need to be revisited to re-focus the 
efforts of the vortal management team and to ensure that the vortal provides that which it 
was designed to provide.  Other vortal goals, which have become outdated, may need to 
be revisited due to emergent requirements, policy changes, or a reorganization of 
information resources. 
In the absence of guidance from higher organizations, the vortal design team 
should create a vortal goal definition themselves.  This ensures provides forward 
momentum within the vortal design project, provides clarity for the design solution, and 
provides a local reference from which to start.  Below is a simple example of a vortal 
goal definition that describes intended vortal purposes, beneficiaries; and guidance for 
management. 
The Information System vortal is representative of the J6 branch of the 
Commander Third Fleet Staff Organization and provides technical support 
in the form of computer software updates, computer technical manuals, 
information technology (IT) feedback processing, and IT trouble call 
resolution to Third Fleet staff, suppliers, and strategic partners.  We 
provide this support through Internet and intranet accessibility over 
dedicated fiber optic lines, dialup access, and wireless channels. 
A well-written vortal goal definition allows the project management team to align 
the efforts of every subordinate team within the project, to prioritize the allocation of 
identified resources, and to focus the efforts of development on the most important data, 
information, and services provided by the vortal.  An effective vortal goal definition 
answers some fundamental questions such as: 
• Who does the vortal represent? 
• What specific data, information, and services does the vortal provide? 
• Is there any data, information, and services overlap with other vortals? 
• For whom does the vortal provide the data, information and services? 
49 
• How does the vortal provide this data, information, and services? 
Criteria can assess how well written a vortal goal definition is: 
• The goal should be clear, concise, and understandable. 
• The goal should be brief. 
• The goal unmistakably specifies the nature of the vortal, identifying: 
• The vortal’s primary target audiences and their needs; 
• Products and services provided to meet the target audience’s 
needs; 
• How primary technologies affect the vortal solution. 
• The vortal goal applies to all subcomponents. 
• The vortal goal definition identifies characteristics that distinguish the 
vortal from other vortals which provide the same data, information, and 
services. 
Writing an effective vortal goal definition requires research, analysis, synthesis, 
good judgment, perception, patience, and determination.  The development of the vortal 
goal may take several dedicated, uninterrupted sessions by the project management team.  
It may also require field study, target audience surveys, or brainstorming sessions to 
arrive at a goal definition which is broad and yet specific enough to provide guidance for 
project development.  The following steps will assist in the development of a vortal goal 
definition: 
• Identify, list, and review the organizational mission statement, the specific 
applicable policies and doctrine that would impact the vortal and its 
content. 
• Identify and categorize the vortal target audience(s). 
• Identify user requirements of the vortal.   
• Identify the general data, information, and services that the vortal will 
provide. 
• Establish how the vortal shall provide the data, information, and services. 
• Define the vortal goal.  
4. Vortal Requirements 
Vortal requirements mainly concern constraints in handling, managing and 
providing accessibility to vortal content: the data, information and services that are 
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identified within the vortal goal.  Software requirements derive from the analysis of 
content and user interface requirements.  Hardware requirements derive from analysis of 
handling, managing and accessibility requirements of the vortal content. 
Content requirements define architectural needs of the vortal.  Identification of 
specific data, information, and services provided within the vortal assists in development 
of content requirements by identifying what needs to be managed.  Content should be 
limited to that which is necessary to meet the goals of the vortal.  When trying to 
determine the content and what is important, (Collins, 2001) suggested the following 
guidelines: 
 
• Identify roles within the organization that will use the content. 
• Streamline information for these roles. 
• Streamline information associated with the requirements derived from the 
vortal’s goal. 
• Continuously improve published vortal content based on feedback. 
• Provide each targeted role with a perspective of available content. 
The next significant step in content-requirements development is to identify the 
authorized operations that may be performed on the content.  This is particularly 
important in the development of content information-assurance requirements.  
Identification of authorized operations assists in identifying content constraints as well as 
preliminary intrusion points and content weaknesses.  It may be helpful to use universal 
modeling language (UML) “use cases” to assist in developing the requirements for the 
content.  In addition, a version of use cases, called “abuse” cases, may help (McDermott 
and Fox, 1999).  Furthermore, UML-based tools provide the source material for the 
development of vortal requirements and help provide source material for the vortal 
security policy. 
Content correlation is particularly important for the mechanism to manage vortal 
content access and availability.  The term refers to the correlation of target audiences to 
the various content groupings and subsequently correlating these groupings to allowable 
operations.  A tool for this is a correlation matrix.  Vortal content should not be changed 
without prior approval; a content approval process should be developed.  This process 
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should evaluate content changes in light of security concerns as well as whether the 
proposed content supports the vortal goal. 
The interface should follow consistent and acceptable standards of usability as 
supported by studies in human–computer interaction discipline.  Interface requirements 
should be from the end-user’s perspective and should be based on a user-centered design 
which is grounded in the standards of usability and simplicity (Nielsen, 2000).  If the 
interface does not meet the needs of the end user, the application will not receive the 
desired traffic or be used as designed. 
Hardware requirements are also derived from analysis of management, handling, 
accessibility and availability requirements of vortal content as well as from the vortal 
goal.   
5. Vortal Security Policy 
The vortal security policy enforces the specific security requirements of the 
vortal.  It covers protection for vortal content and the necessary vortal resources used to 
support vortal content management, handling, and processing.  Formulating it 
necessitates studying the requirements for (1) protection from threats and vulnerabilities 
and (2) security services necessary to afford adequate protection based on content value 
and threats. 
Content domains, which consolidate vortal content into groupings based on 
content sensitivity, help content security.  The following steps are helpful: 
• Identify the operational requirements of specific content domains.   
• Identify vortal-availability requirements of these domains based on target 
audience needs.   
• Define the priority of availability under reduced hardware capabilities, 
such as during maintenance and casualty response.  
• Define the resource security requirements of each content domain in light 
of the organizational security policy.   
Content availability requirements influence vortal architecture design.  They 
require consideration of the following: 
• Vortal Goal requirements 
• Content security requirements 
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• System backup requirements 
• Hardware and software maintenance requirements 
• Normal operational requirements 
• Organization policy (e.g. contingency planning and organization mission) 
• Preliminary threat and vulnerability analyses of proposed vortal hardware 
and software. 
Researching the known vulnerabilities of proposed vortal hardware and software 
can provide good material for the vulnerability analysis (Pfleeger, 1997).  Defining 
possible access points on the network diagram as well as creating threat profiles using 
common criteria methodology can assist in the identification of threats to the overall 
vortal.  In addition, as previously noted, abuse cases can develop system threats.  
Adequate software and hardware configuration management, discussed later, is also 
critical to maintaining vortal security. 
It is important to ask what modes of vortal access will be allowed.  For example, 
will the vortal be accessible through a wireless web browser, a corporate intranet or the 
Internet, and/or a dial-up connection?  Modes of access should first be defined by the 
vortal goal and then by the needs of the target audience and current organizational policy.  
Different access modes may present different security considerations that will need to be 
addressed in the vortal security policy and the subsequently generated vortal security 
architecture. 
Brainstorming or exploring ideas in a somewhat random fashion can suggest areas 
for security consideration.  However, UML use cases provide a mechanism to quite 
thoroughly explore previously unconsidered issues (Larman, 1998).  Once use cases are 
defined, a logical network diagram to graphically represent network architecture can 
greatly help rapid identification of network entry points and vortal access points. 
A preliminary risk analysis provides information for the overall planning and 
development of the vortal (Pfleeger, 1997).  This analysis can assess potential risks to the 
system prior to its rollout.  It can also assist with contingency, safety, security, financial, 
and maintenance planning.  Finally, a preliminary risk analysis provides the basis for a 
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comprehensive risk-management plan.  This plan can assist in decision making and 
provide the prioritized actions necessary to appropriately manage risks. 
 
C. ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Architectural design is necessary for systems that are standardized, productive, 
secure, and defensible.  It provides a guide map to maintain focus in the development of a 
system so that it satisfies its intended goals and objectives.  Further, architecture helps to 
solidify a development route and methods used.  It increases credibility of the 
development process and provides a framework where measurements can be obtained, in 









Figure 25.   High Level ORIS Architectural Environment 
 
1. Organizational Information System (ORIS) Architecture 
ORIS architecture is a high-level conceptual architecture derived from 
organizational requirements.  Requirements are translated into one or more processes, 
which may be illustrated as abstract modules displaying the main conceptual areas of the 
architecture.  Figure 25 illustrates a simple example of ORIS architecture.  Each module 
can be broken down into standardized non-specific components, which further refine the 
abstract diagram (e.g. terminal elements, and network elements).  Figure 26 further 



















Figure 26.   High Level ORIS Architecture Refined 
A high-level ORIS architecture can define, in a simple way, the overall ORIS 
requirements.  In addition, it may be used to help develop boundary limitations for the 
subordinate ORIS architectural entities that represent significant processes and projects 
within the organization.  When thoroughly defined, ORIS architecture can provide a 
standardized set of rules for management, handling, and a common terminology for many 
different information systems.  Finally, it provides a reference mechanism which supports 
the rapid development of subparts by defining the context for integration and the limiting 
boundaries.  
The ORIS security architecture is defined within the constraints of organizational 
requirements and derived from the ORIS security policy as well as the larger ORIS 
architecture.  Figure 27 refines, within the context of security, one portion of the ORIS 
architecture example provided in Figure 26 based upon communications protocols as well 
as physical and administrative environments.   
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Figure 27.   Example ORIS Security Architecture—Dial Up Network  
 
2. Vortal Architecture  
Vortal architecture is a necessary part of the development process.  It provides a 
guide map to the implementation of the vortal.  It provides a framework which sets 
limiting boundaries and focuses the efforts of vortal development. 
For ease of management and handling as well as implementation, content should 
be subdivided into content domains.  These domains contain categorized groupings of 
data, information, and services, but also authorized operations on the content.  For ease of 
management and handling, each content domain should be further subdivided by data-
object storage method (will the data be stored in a database, a data file, or an application 
data file?)  This further subdivision provides clarification and the means to create a 
hardware design that will ensure higher levels of data security. 
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Vortal requirements help to determine what features are required for the core 
management system.  A decision whether to design it or use a prepackaged configurable 
software application should be made based on vortal requirements, content domain 
requirements, and content value plus other requirements from entities such as higher 
authorities, the vortal security policy, or applicable doctrine.  Any determination for 
specific technology such as the extensible mark-up language (XML) or some other 
standard must be evaluated similarly.  
Proper software application design and configuration reduces security problems.  
When applications are correctly designed, they handle proper improper input data 
gracefully and do not provide unauthorized root access to the application server, perform 
unauthorized operations, or gain unauthorized access to resources.  The application 
should be tested over a wide range of data inputs including null inputs and incorrect 
values.  To assist with vulnerability reduction, the design can designate another 
protection layer. 
Data storage and handling strategy should have provisions for rapid recovery in 
the event of disaster as well as mechanisms to ensure confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of data.  It should provide security limitations compliant with the vortal 
security policy as well as the ORIS security policy.  User-level access to data would be 
limited to indirect access via trusted vortal accessible software applications. 
3. Vortal Security Architecture 
Vortal security architecture is a logical architecture that details design rules as 
well as all system aspects related to security (Gasser, 1988).  There are four areas of 
concern. 
Vortal components are composed of the objects (e.g. hardware, software, and 
transmission systems) that comprise the logical design of the vortal architecture; these 
components that may be used as initial starting points for subsequent security analyses. 
Identification of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks help to indicate the weaknesses 
and associated costs within the vortal.  They help to provide justification and direction to 
the development of security.  They may be prioritized for the concentration of security 
resources.   
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Security-policy critical application points are logical decision points that directly 
support the vortal security policy.  It is important that the vortal does not have too many 
or too few.  Too many points mean that the vortal has too many potential weaknesses; too 
few points mean that the vortal may not be practical to use.  Therefore, a balance must be 
obtained.  
Security services provide the essential security support to vortal security-policy 
critical application points.  Each service must be designed so that authorized transactions 
are allowed to occur while unauthorized transactions are not.  There are six main security 
services (International Standards Office, 1998): 
• Authentication:  This establishes proof of user identity and provides 
subsequent authorizations or rights for the identified user. 
• Confidentiality:  This assigns the authorized user their material disclosure 
limits. 
• Integrity:  This assigns to the authorized user any limits to their ability to 
make changes to data. 
• Access control:  This determines user authority.  Subsequently, it provides 
to the controlling mechanism the explicit use of computer resources based 
on the user’s authority. 
• Non-repudiation:  This provides evidence to prevent unilateral 
modification or termination of obligations in an authorized computer 
transaction. 
• Availability:  This provides automated routing of information, load 
balancing, and system traffic accommodation to ensure that resources are 
usable on demand. 
4. Design Assessment 
Design assessment is the process of validating the vortal architecture and vortal 
security architecture to ensure that the implementation correctly met the intended goals of 
the vortal.  The following are recommended steps.  
• Define the scope of the assessment.   
• Define the metrics to be used within the assessment to establish what is to 
be measured and the limits of the measurement. 
• Establish the method of measurement.  This is important because it 
determines the viability of measurement results.  This is important when 
determining trends and recommending changes based on those trends.   
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• Establish the measurement collection mechanism.  This provides the 
precision and determines the accuracy of the metrics used.  It should be 
tested before it is used to ensure that the measurement taker is adequate 
collect the data. 
• Establish how often the data should be collected before the collection of 
data begins.  It should be determined from the metrics used and the 
intended use of the data. 
• Sort and interpret the data to determine any trends and to formulate 
appropriate feedback.  A variety of interpretation techniques should be 
used.  
• Provide feedback to the data collection mechanism, method, and metrics. 
• Provide goal feedback based on trends in the collected data. 
• Provide architecture feedback based on trends in the collected data or 
obvious deficiencies in the vortal architecture or vortal security 
architecture.  Submit it for change approval prior to implementation. 
D. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROTOTYPING 
Significant benefits of a well-planned solution are lost if a solution is poorly 
executed.  For example, if a vortal solution is well designed and properly fielded but 
incorrectly configured then the designed security mechanisms may be overcome or 
bypassed.  This may result in compromise of not only the local area network that may be 
connected to the vortal but also the data, information, and other services that are available 
to the vortal.  But similarly, a poorly planned solution that is executed well cannot 
reasonably guarantee any degree of security within an information system.  For example, 
if a vortal architecture requires both data and applications on the same server and a user 
gains unauthorized access to the server because of a buffer overflow within a vortal 
application, the user gain complete access rights to the data to which they may not have 
authorization. 
One of the many tools for implementation of a vortal project is small-scale 
prototyping.  It can be cost-effective if it creates opportunities to identify and correct 
rough spots before the full-scale implementation is undertaken.  In addition, proper 
prototyping can validate or invalidate a particular solution and provides a mechanism 




1. Designing the Implementation Plan 
A good way to implement a vortal is to start with a plan or implementation 
strategy.  If the vortal will be a significant service for the organization, then it will be a 
long-term endeavor.  Successful long-term endeavors require a well-developed plan for 
implementation.  But to develop and implement a vortal there is no single “cookbook” 
approach to making a plan. 
A vortal can cause changes in how organization work is accomplished.  
Implementation planning should identify the sequence to make those changes and the 
people involved.  A well-conceived plan provides a mechanism to avoid the “false starts” 
typical of unplanned initiatives.  An approved plan demonstrates leadership commitment 
and helps organization members understand their role in leading and supporting the vortal 
project.  Senior-level commitment is often deepened through inclusion or participation in 
the implementation planning process. 
• A good implementation plan with milestones will assist an organization to: 
• Set up a timeline for actions. 
• Allow for assessment of progress on the vortal. 
• Establish necessary mechanisms to cope with the changes associated with 
integrating the vortal into the organization's way of doing business. 
• Begin focusing decision-making processes towards vortal support.     
• Create and maintain a user-centered focus regarding the vortal. 
• Understand better how organization work is accomplished. 
• Improve leadership thinking. 
The following are some cautionary notes to consider when developing the vortal 
implementation plan: 
• Don’t front-load the implementation plan.  Often organizations become 
too optimistic about the quantity of work and assign early milestones, yet 
are reticent to assign additional resources to complete the rest of the work.  
• Perform a logic check on an implementation plan to ensure that tasks are 
sequenced correctly with adequate resource allocation.   
• Implementation plans can be modified when the need arises.  But too 
many due dates postponed may signify a lack of proper planning and 
commitment to accomplish the project. 
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• An effective way to ensure that the end goal is met is to display and 
promote the plan as much as possible throughout the organization.  This 
can be accomplished by providing periodic updates to organization 
members.   
• Periodically updated copies of the implementation plan should be 
provided to the personnel who are assigned milestones to accomplish.  
This reminds them of their tasks as well as indicates the impact on the 
overall project if they fail. 
• Use software and hardware configuration management.  An improperly 
configured system provides many avenues for unauthorized system access. 
• Include only necessary hardware and software functionality to meet the 
requirements of the architecture. 
• Consider the logical network diagram as a tool from which to draw 
information in developing the implementation plan. 
2. Prototyping the Design 
Prototypes are a means of starting the vortal implementation process and a tool 
for improving the quality of the delivered vortal.  They are small design assessment steps 
to help direct the development process.  Development efforts will always yield mistakes, 
but mistakes can be minimized through the use and analysis of prototypes.  Prototypes 
demonstrate specific objectives which support the vortal goal and demonstrate 
functionality in light of security.  In addition, they help maintain a user-centered focus 
throughout the vortal project. 
The vortal development team and resource managers decide what will be 
prototyped.  One method is to take the vortal logical diagram and identify a part whose 
performance is measurable, has a high probability for success, and has a high project 
impact.  Another method is to develop a broader prototype within a content domain.  
With prototypes, the vortal development team creates opportunities to apply what they 
have learned during design.  
Prototypes can provide useful information.  Limited scope prototypes with clearly 
defined objectives seem to provide more data than broad-scope prototypes with vague 
objectives.  Data obtained from prototype evaluation can be used to improve not only the 
vortal but the methods for building a prototype.  
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E. TESTING, VALIDATION, EVALUATION, CERTIFICATION AND 
ACCREDITATION 
Testing the full implementation will identify flaws in the functionality and 
performance of component modules within the overall system.  In addition, testing can be 
applied to the overall system design as well.  For example, testing can identify flaws in 
the hardware, software, and interface usability. But successfully passing a test does not 
demonstrate the absence of a flaw.  In addition, it is difficult to achieve adequate test 
coverage because of the complexity of various inputs and states of a system.  
Furthermore, powerful “white-box” or internal-structure testing requires modification of 
the implementation to obtain data, which affects the solution and may become a 
subsequent source of vulnerabilities (Pfleeger, 1997).  
Validation and evaluation are used to prove system correctness.  These efforts can 
be used to convince users that a system correctly implements stated goals.  In addition, it 
can prove that a system correctly implements stated policies.  Validation is less rigorous 
than reducing a system to a theorem and proving it.  Validation is more general and 
attempts to convince people of the correctness of a solution.  Validation may be 
performed several ways:  
• Requirements testing may be used to cross-check system requirements 
with execution-time system behavior.  The goal is to demonstrate that the 
system performs all functional requirements.  But often this only 
demonstrates that the system does everything required in one situation, not 
that the system doesn’t do what it should not do.  
• Design and code reviews rely on system designers and programmers to 
scrutinize system design and system code.  The goal is to identify and 
correct any incorrect assumptions, errors, inconsistent behavior, or faulty 
logic during system creation.  Success depends on the rigor of review.   
• Module and system testing uses selected data to check system correctness.  
It relies on programmers, system designers, or independent testing teams 
to conduct these checks.  Test data is organized to examine execution 
paths, conditional statements, output reports, variable changes, etc.  The 
goal is to check all objects methodically.  
Most users are not security experts.  Therefore, evaluation by an independent third 
party can be desirable to prove adequacy and accuracy of test coverage, validate 
correctness conclusions, or determine that a system correctly implements security policy.  
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Independent experts can “review the requirements, design, implementation, and 
assurance evidence of a system.”  There are many evaluation schemes available.  
Recently Common Criteria seems to be gaining momentum as a scheme for evaluation.  
Certifications determine if technical mechanisms in the vortal effectively meet a 
particular standard, e.g. FIPS 140 or NSA Type 1 encryption.  This can be useful for 
insurance and liability analysis as well as for the development of risks for system level 
risk management.  Certification is defined as the technical evaluation of security features 
and other safeguards (Department of Defense 2001).  It is used to support the 
accreditation process and can be used to define a minimum standard for security.  When 
changes are made in the vortal system, recertification of the changed system is necessary. 
Accreditation is endorsement by an accrediting organization that a vortal’s 
performance successfully meets criteria.  Accreditation criteria can assist in the 
development of a risk management plan as the criteria provide a reference from which to 
define areas for further investigation.  In addition, the act of gaining accreditation can be 
important in building trust with users as well as with organizations insuring against 
liabilities and lapses in performance.  Accreditation is defined as the authorization by a 
designated approving authority that an information system may be placed into operation 
(Department of Defense, 2001).  It confirms acceptance of a system’s configuration, 
design, and architecture. 
F. FEEDBACK 
Sometimes referred to as maintenance, the feedback process provides the 
mechanism by which improvements are made to a working system.  An effective and 
efficient vortal system is the result of abundant feedback.  Improvements cannot be made 
if deficiencies are not openly identified and addressed in an honest and forthright manner.  
A well-defined, dedicated, and robust feedback process has significant benefits: It can 
assist in fielding timely improvements to the vortal system, and can produce consistent 


























To illustrate concepts and methodology described in the last chapter, a simple 
Navy development example of a secure vortal architecture and associated security 
architecture is presented.  The example focuses on architecture development and 
illustrates required efforts necessary to produce a secure vortal, but does not include an 
implementation plan. 
The example vortal supports a fictitious ship, USS NEVERSAIL; it is a typical 
naval ship, roughly a cruiser.  Assume the normal crew size is about 250 personnel with 
25 officers (a commanding officer, an executive officer, department heads, and division 
officers).  Most ships of this type carry land attack missiles, ship-to-ship missiles, 
surface-to-air missiles, anti-submarine weapons, and a main gun system for naval surface 
fire support.  Normal warfare areas assigned to this ship could include undersea warfare 
(ship or helicopter to submarine engagements), strike warfare (land attack using cruise 
missiles), surface warfare (ship-to-ship engagements), air warfare (surface-to-air 
engagements), theater ballistic missile defense, maritime interdiction operations and 
leadership interdiction operations.  The majority of the shipboard computing environment 
is made up of multiple redundant weapons computing systems that are standalone and 
receive their inputs directly from onboard sensors and sometimes from other Battle 
Group asset sensors.  The remaining shipboard computing environment is handled 
through other IP based computing networks.  These networks exist to handle the 
organizational administrative support requirements as well as to automate some manual 
processes within shipboard command and control. 
Command and control is currently handled through the abovementioned weapons 
computing systems, through manually generated human input (e.g. radio messaging 
system, radio telephone, signal flags, semaphore coded messages, flashing light 
messages), or through these other IP based computing networks.  The IP based 
computing systems that include the network supporting this example vortal have become 
the popular systems for timely collaboration, integration, aggregation and consolidation 
of vital data, information, and other services that are associated with command and 
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control as well as administrative support.  The USS NEVERSAIL vortal example 
provides mechanisms to support information superiority through timely knowledge 
management.  For a ship, information superiority is the foundation of successful 
command and control. 
A. ASSEMBLE THE RIGHT TEAM 
Traditionally, IP based networks are designed, tested, installed, and owned by 
Navy Network Warfare Command via SPAWAR Systems Command.  Shipboard 
personnel are assigned to perform network administration and some rudimentary network 
maintenance.  Maintenance of these networks is funded through an assigned ship 
maintenance budget.  Frequently, resource sponsors that are external to the ship will 
provide funding for initiatives like a shipboard vortal that has potential to enhance the 
warfighting capability of military assets.   
The exact makeup of a design team will depend on the knowledge and skills of 
constituent members as well as the vortal goal.  Where shortfalls in knowledge or skill 
exist, it may be of benefit to hire contract experts to cover those discrepancies.  
Generally, for the design and planning of the vortal, a team should be formed that 
includes knowledgeable members of the vortal target audience, supervisors of the 
personnel assigned to perform network administration and maintenance, resource 
sponsors both external and internal to the ship, any required contractors, and 
representatives of the organizations that support the greater network architecture (e.g. 
Navy Communications and Telecommunications Stations, Navy Network Operations 
Centers, etc.).   
Implementation constraints are defined by the limitations of the communications 
network architecture to be used (e.g. the shipboard system-high classified network 
architecture, satellite communications network architecture, network operations center’s 
system-high classified network architecture, etc.) as well as network accreditation, 
certification and operations standards (e.g. IT21, DITSCAP, TF WEB architecture 
standards, DoD website requirements).  These standards and requirements will provide 
the necessary guidance for software and hardware to help design and plan the vortal.  
Contract requirements and limitations are outlined in applicable Navy supply regulations 
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and publications.  In addition, it may be beneficial to research existing contracts and 
identify if any existing contract can be modified to accommodate the contract 
requirements for the vortal.  This will considerably reduce the amount of effort to 
administratively process a contract requirement. 
B. CONCEPT & CONTENT DEVELOPMENT 
1. Organizational Policies and Mission 
Assume a review of USS NEVERSAIL’s organizational policies and mission 
statement yielded a list of guidance and capabilities, selected by the USS NEVERSAIL’s 
chain-of-command for vortal inclusion based on their impact on the organizational 
mission:   
• Provide daily status of operational readiness and training. 
• Provide a mechanism to manage the system of processes for material 
maintenance management of ship equipment. 
• Maintain communications with higher authority and other battle group and 
expeditionary strike group assets. 
• Safely navigate the ship. 
• Provide up-to-date access to publications and equipment technical 
manuals. 
2. User Inputs 
User inputs were obtained from surveys and interviews.  Inputs were grouped and 
categorized according to similarities.  Suppose the USS NEVERSAIL’s chain of 
command identified the following as the highest-priority user requirements: 
• A more user-friendly and available message processing system.  These 
messages include: situation reports, personnel administrative messages, 
guidance from flag officers (e.g. admirals, generals, etc), contact reports 
(with other ships, submarines, or aircraft), ship operational tasking orders, 
ship administrative tasking orders (e.g. ship tour for a visiting dignitary, 
assignment as acting squadron commander in the absence of the ship’s 
squadron commander) ship support requests (e.g. equipment part requests, 
import shore services, tug support for getting underway or returning to 
port, etc) as well as communications of a general nature to support a 
tasked operation.   
• Weather information for safe navigation.  This includes information 
regarding weather in advance of a ship’s movement as well as weather 
information that may have an impact to the ship during a tasked operation. 
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• Parts ordering and a material maintenance trouble-call system. 
 
3. Vortal Target Audience 
Suppose from brainstorming and categorization, a list of vortal target-audience 
groups was produced covering the significant stakeholders: 
• Higher authority 
• Ship’s company 
• Shore-based support organizations 
• Other Battle Group or Expeditionary Strike Group assets 
4. Vortal Content 
Suppose a vortal-project team-brainstorming session yielded the listing of data, 






Provide daily status of  operational 
readiness
Higher authority, other Battle Group 
and Expeditionary Strike Group assets, 
ship's company, shore-based support 
organizations
Training status 
information Provide status of  training
Higher authority, other battle group and 
Expeditionary Strike Group assets, 
ship's company, shore-based support 
organizations
Fuel and w eapon 
status information
Provide status of  operational 
readiness
Higher authority, other Battle Group 
and Expeditionary Strike Group assets, 




Mechanism to manage material 
maintenance system
Ship's company, shore-based support 
organizations
Parts ordering Mechanism to manage material 
maintenance system
Ship's company, shore-based support 
organizations
Weather 
information Safe navigation of  ship
Higher authority, other Battle Group 
and Expeditionary Strike Group assets, 





Provide access to up-to-date 
publications and equipment technial 
manuals




More user-f riendly and available 
message processing system; 
communicate f rom higher authority, 
other Battle Group and 
Expeditionary Strike Group assets
Ship's company
Chat
Communicate w ith higher authority, 
other Battle Group and 
Expeditionary Strike Group assets
Ship's company w atchstanders, 
specif ic Battle Group and Expeditionary 
Strike Group w atchstanders
 
Table 4 Correlation Table For Combined Resource and Target Audience to Requirements 
 
C. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT   
1. Organizational Requirements 
In the case of USS NEVERSAIL, suppose the organization is required to maintain 
two system-high networks using identical network architectures and one multi-level 
security network.  Of the two system-high networks, one is classified and the other is 
unclassified.  Due to space and electrical power limitations, USS NEVERSAIL system 
redundancy is limited to a single set of backup servers per network.  If the functionality is 
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vital, additional server installations can be provided.  “Reachback” connectivity to the 
terrestrial portion of each network is via a single 14 megabits-per-second satellite channel 
shared by the three networks; satellite bandwidth can be dynamically allocated on the 
ship.  Network traffic prior to vortal implementation through the satellite channel for all 
networks is no greater than 6 megabits per second, so design must find a way to increase 
it. 
Users access networks through physically connected network workstations.  
Secure wireless connectivity on the ship is being considered for the system-high 
unclassified network.  Each system-high network is router-based with a fiber optic 
backbone.  The multi-level security network is switch-based with all connectivity through 
dedicated fiber optic cable. 
2. Organizational Security Policy 
Suppose for the USS NEVERSAIL, generalized preliminary evaluations of the 
three networks indicate that the following network resources require protection: 
workstations, network devices, network servers, cryptographic equipment, cryptographic 
equipment key material, and satellite equipment.  The following policies exist: 
• Physical security policies that govern the physical security requirements 
for network resources are implemented.   
• Password policies that govern selection and handling of passwords are 
implemented.  User passwords are required to be 10 alphanumeric and 
special characters.  System Administrators and network support staff 
passwords are required to be 14 alphanumeric and special characters.  In 
addition, passwords are effective for no greater than 90 days.  Password-
cracking software is used to audit user passwords. 
• System-administrator policies dictate documentation and general 
administrative requirements as well as allowable operations, actions, 
accountability, and limitations on system administrators.  Security audits 
are conducted daily at the beginning of each network administrator shift.  
Current network operations and staffing allow for three eight-hour 
network administrator shifts per day.   
• Network backup policies dictate requirements for each shift as well as 
each computing day.   
• Network device configuration policies dictate the required actions, audits 
(successful and failed user attempts), documentation, and limitations for 
authorized network support staff.   
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• Network server configuration policies dictate the required actions, 
requirements, documentation, and limitations for authorized network 
support staff that setup and configure network servers.   
• Workstation configuration and maintenance policies dictate the required 
actions, documentation, audits, and limitations for network-support staff 
that setup, configure, and maintain network workstations.   
• Network-resource user policies are implemented and dictate the 
responsibility, accountability, and limits of network resource use for 
authorized network users.   
• Disaster recovery policies detail requirements, responsibilities, 
accountability, documentation, and actions of applicable personnel.   
• Intrusion-detection and anti-virus software are installed and properly 
configured.  In addition, machine-address code filtering is implemented in 
all network devices. 
• Training policies dictate the frequency, quantity, and type of training 
required for network administrators, network support staff, and users.  
Training includes scenario drills, classroom knowledge, and individual 
supervised hands-on training.  Training program audits are conducted 
monthly by the USS NEVERSAIL’s chain of command. 
• Individual policies are reviewed annually by all network administrators, 
network support staff and support staff for clarity, revision and familiarity. 
3. Vortal Goal Definition 
Suppose that through a series of meetings, the NEVERSAIL chain of command 
developed the vortal goal statement from the list of desired capabilities, target audience 
stakeholders, and user inputs: 
The NEVERSAIL vortal is representative of USS NEVERSAIL and 
provides operational support by access to up-to-date status information 
about operational readiness, training information, publications and 
equipment technical manuals, weather information, and material-
maintenance management and communications to ship’s company, higher 
authority, shore-based organizations and other Battle Group or 
Expeditionary Strike Group assets.  We provide this support through 
Intranet accessibility over a dedicated system-high classified network.  
4. Vortal Requirements 
In the context of the USS NEVERSAIL, several factors were considered in 
formulating requirements: subject content, information classification, target-audience 
network-access availability (i.e. number of workstations available), allocated satellite 
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bandwidth and throughput, vortal bandwidth and throughput requirements, and 
organizational information system architecture.  These factors were prioritized.  The 
highest priorities were content-information classification and the availability to the target 
audience.  Based on these priorities, it was decided to implement the vortal on the 
system-high classified network. 
a. Content Requirements 
Figure 28 shows the “basic” hybrid information environment “use case” 














Figure 28.   “Basic” Discover-Locate-Request-Deliver Use Case (From Gardner, 
1999a) 
 
The “<<extend>>“ notation suggests the performance of one action is an 
add-on to another.  Initiation of “Locate” may be performed by either the user or system 
during the discovery phase where other resource-description information and locations 
are shown.  Another allowed possibility is that a resource may be requested without a 
selected location.  The system would then find possible locations and offer a choice of 
them to the user or selecting one based on user preferences (Gardner, 1999a).   
Following Gardner, the basic use case would support the following: 
• Cases in which equipment-part descriptions and location information have 
separate providers.  Users may first make work-level resource discovery.  
Subsequently, they may locate desired resources while moving to the 
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instance level.  This is likely when ships and shore-based storage facilities 
possess quantities of the same part in their storerooms. 
• Cases in which equipment-part descriptions and location information have 
the same provider.  For example an equipment part may be located at 
various “mirror” storerooms in USS NEVERSAIL. 
• Cases in which requests are initiated after discovery.  Then during item 
requests a location must be selected.  For example, a user may request 
weather information and be offered a choice of mirror sites from which to 
download this information. 
• Cases where no information-discovery phase is required.  For example, 
users who want to obtain weather information are directed to the nearest 
mirrored site. 
It is expected that a hybrid information environment will mix information, 
behaviors and possibilities for interoperability.  An important concern is that sufficient 
information regarding a resource must exist prior to delivery.   In addition, delivery could 
take place outside system boundaries.  For example, it is expected that a Fleet Industrial 
Supply Center (provider) would initiate a delivery task within the electronic system, for 
logging and tracking purposes, even if actual equipment delivery is physical and not 
electronic.  In other cases the delivery could occur through the electronic system. 
 
 
Figure 29.   “Detail” Use Case Describing the Discovery Level of Resources (From 
Gardner, 1999a) 
 
Multiple editions, formats, languages, or versions of information with 
similar content may be available at different locations.  This can create difficulties within 
queries if different levels of detail are required depending on context.  Figure 29 
illustrates the “detail” use case describing the functional-discovery level of resources.  
Previously the treatment of the “locate” was as a separately-driven user action.  This 
73 
works well in a hybrid information environment where a single query is initiated to 
multiple providers for a specific resource.  In other circumstances, location may be only 
one detail required to specify a deliverable resource.  To support the acquisition of such 
descriptors as versions, formats, and other details, the “detail” use case is employed to 
ensure that the correct ‘instance’ of a deliverable resource is captured. 
“Detail” use cases provide a selection of details to narrow a particular 
resource’s instances.  Arrow notation in Figure 29 identifies locate, format, and 
conditions as specific use-case variants.  These use cases may be viewed as a first step in 
discovery because they provide a listing of resources (e.g. the same document in formats 
RTF, HTML, and DOC).  An important detail is the conditions and terms related to a 
resource, as a cost that varies across providers.  For example, a user can view a document 
(resource instance) on a remote server (provider) with an initial load refresh of 15 
seconds, or the document can be downloaded over the network at a cost of 15 minutes. 
 
Figure 30.   “Enter” Use Case for System-Entry Behavior (From Gardner, 1999a) 
 
The “enter” use case for user input (Figure 30) supports tailored 
information landscapes with authenticated user access to provide the appropriate user 
authorizations, preferences, and entitlements.  In addition, in hybrid information 
environment it is typical for current session information, such as results from the most 
recent search to be maintained.  There may be a need for authenticated access for a guest 
user in addition to a member user.  Their tailored information landscape is limited to what 
is available in the current session as their profile, whereas user preferences via profiles 
are available to member users.  Note that if a user is not entitled to see it then an object 
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will not be made visible.  Table 5 displays several such variations on the “enter” use case 
scenario. 
Normal Variation 1 Variation 2 Variation 3
Step 
1
User loads top-level 
Web page.
User attempts to 
access a service 
requiring 
authentication.
User loads top-level 
Web page.












name and passw ord.
Step 
3
New session init iated 
and information 
landscape presented 
based on user profile.
After successful 
authentication, user 
sent to service they 
attempted to access.
System continues a 





return user to step 2 
for another attempt.
 
Table 5 “Enter” Use Case Scenario Under Normal Conditions and With Several 
Variations (Adapted From Gardner, 1999a) 
 
 
Figure 31.   “Exit” Use Case Describing System Exit Behaviors (From Gardner, 
1999a) 
 
During system exit (Figure 31), users could be offered an unambiguous 
fixed exit that clears the session or users may have alternatives such as a predefined time-
out period or an “end session” use case.  
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Figure 32.   “Discover” Use Case Describing Resource Discovery Behaviors (From 
Gardner, 1999a) 
 
The “discover” use case uses `tools' to crawl through the information 
landscape.  This can include free-text and metadata search as well as browsing, viewing 
bookmarks and what's new, and so on.  Table 6 shows several variations. 
 





System makes tool available without 
user selection (e.g. free-text search box 
on every page).








T ool  configured in context  of current 
information landscape, user profile, 
and/or session information.






Search refinement tool offered to 
further refine a list ing of current search 
results.
Negative response tool is used if 






Results displayed to user. Results displayed to user.
 
Table 6 “Discover” Use Case Scenario Under Normal Conditions and With Several 
Variations (Adapted From Gardner, 1999a) 
 
The use cases provided are only a few of the many that could be 
developed for the USS NEVERSAIL vortal.  In addition, “abuse” cases can identify 
unacceptable behavior.  An abuse case is defined as a “specification of a type of complete 
interaction between a system and one or more actors, where the results of the interaction 
are harmful to the system, one of the actors, or one of the stakeholders in the system 
76 
(McDermott and Fox, 1999).”  An abuse case focuses on transactions between actors and 
the system that result in harm.  They describe the actors, their resources, skills and long 
term goals. 
For example, consider the abuse case of a Script Kiddie on the system-
high classified network.  They typically work alone, although they may share information 
they obtain with other Script Kiddies.  They have limited technical expertise and perform 
most of their activities using tools and techniques developed by others.  They desire to 
demonstrate their technical ability and may have unlawful objectives including theft and 
vandalism.  They have available hardware, software, and network access.  Script Kiddie 
abuse may be: 
• Installation of unauthorized software utilities using administrative or user 
privileges on a host computer. 
• Single-instance control of an administrative account or session on a host 
computer. 
• Single-instance control of a privileged user account or session on a host 
computer. 
An example abuse case would be when the Script Kiddie initiates or 
requests a session on a network host using the TCP/IP protocol and an unauthorized 
software utility.  A session is established; if the session is with sufficient privilege or a 
system software flaw is exploited such as a buffer overflow, the Script Kiddie will 
attempt to initiate an operating system level support function such as a command shell, 
file manager, editor, or debugger for the purpose of loading additional unauthorized 
software to obtain increased privileges or to copy privileged files.  If any of these 
privileged files increase Script Kiddie abilities or meets their interests and objectives, the 
files are downloaded and copied for future use.  If vandalism is their objective, a Script 






b. Content Correlation 
Content correlation connects allowable object operations with target 
audience groupings and objects.  Table 7 shows the correlation matrix for the USS 
NEVERSAIL secure vortal project.  Table 8 shows the assigned user roles for the vortal. 
               
Subjects             
Objects
Content Managers Content Maintainers Browsing Users
Links
Read Only: Can see the link  
Read/Write:  Can see the link and modify 
andy of its properties
Read Only:  Can see the link  
Read/Write:  Can modify the link's 
name and description
Read Only:  Can see the link   
Read/Write:  Can see the link
Folders
Read Only:  Can browse the folder   
Read/Write:  Can submit, move and 
remove links, move, delete, or modify the 
folder                                                       
Read/Write/Approve:  Can add and 
remove links, and approve links submitted 
byh users or imported by agents
Read Only:  Can browse the folder  
Read/Write:  Can submit, move 
and remove links, move or delete 
folder    Read/Write/Approve:  
Can add and remove links, and 
approve links submitted by users or 
imported by agents
Read:  Can browse the folder   
Read/Write:  Can submit links 
to the folder, pending approval   
Read/Write/Approve:  Can 
submit pre-approved links into 
the folder
Publications
Read Only:  Can see the publication  
Read/Write:  Can modify or delete the 
publication and approve its issues
Read Only:  Can subscribe to the 
publication over the Web                 
Read/Write:  Can approve issues 
of the publication
Read Only:  Can subscribe to 
the publication over the Web  
Read/Write: Can subscribe to 
the publication over the Web
Interoperability 
Modules
Read Only:  Can use the Module and 
personalize it where applicable  
Read/Write:  Can modify or delete the 
Module
Read Only:  Can use the Module, 
and personalize it where applicable  
Read/Write:  Can use the Module, 
and personalize it where applicable
Read Only:  Can use the 
Module, and personalize it where 
it applicable     Read/Write:  
Can use the Module and 
personalize it where applicable
Data Sources
Read Only:  Can see the and crawl the 
data source, and create links to 
information in the data source   
Read/Write:  Can modify or delete the 
data source
Read Only:  Can submit links to 
information in the data source
Read Only:  Can submit links to 
information in the data source
Properties
Read Only:  Can see the property's 
values  Read/Write:  Can modify the 
property's values or delete it
Read Only:  Can see the 
property's values
Read Only:  Can see the 
property's values
User Groups
Read Only:  Can see the user group  





Read Only:  Can see the agent   




Read Only:  Can see the document type  




Read Only:  Can see the job  
Read/Write:  Can add or remove 




















Higher authority, other Battle Group and 
Expeditionary Strike Group assets, 








Higher authority, other battle group and 
Expeditionary Strike Group assets, 
ship's company, shore-based support 
organizations








Higher authority, other Battle Group and 
Expeditionary Strike Group assets, 







Engineering Dept, Port 
Engineer, Tender Repair 
Officer, SIMA  Project 
Officer, or Shipyard 
Project Officer 















based Weather Support, 
Battle Group or 
Expeditionary Strike 
Group Weather
Higher authority, other Battle Group and 
Expeditionary Strike Group assets, 



















Operations Dept Ship's company




Ship's company watchstanders, specific 
Battle Group and Expeditionary Strike 
Group watchstanders  





c. Interface Requirements 
Suppose the USS NEVERSAIL contracts a professional web-design 
organization whose specialty is usability and interface design.  In addition, the U.S. 
Navy’s Task Force Web provides templates, and USS NEVERSAIL personnel provided 
guidance to the contracted web design team to develop the vortal interfaces.  Interfaces 
should be designed for interoperability.  For example, interface design could use 
preprocessor dynamic web languages such as Microsoft’s application server page (ASP), 
SUN Microsystem’s java server page (JSP), or personal home pages (PHP). 
d. Hardware Requirements 
Hardware needs to be compatible and compliant with organizational 
information system requirements such as the IT21 standard.  For the USS NEVERSAIL, 
availability requirements of three required resources are high.  Table 9 displays the 
prioritized USS NEVERSAIL vortal content resources with their recommended 
availability.  The required availability of these resources can obtained through 
mechanisms such as clustering and external redundancy. 
Chat functionality is of highest priority and requires a chat server.  This 
functionality can be done with access to chat servers located onboard as well as 
externally.  To support availability, the servers should be redundant, load-balanced, and 
clustered.  This would allow for hardware that is scalable and accessible, and the chat 
server cluster would be seen as a single virtual server to users.  Further, this hardware 
configuration would support graceful degradation of services if servers fail. 
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Table 9 Prioritized USS NEVERSAIL Vortal Resources With Associated Availability 
Requirements. 
 
We recommend that each vortal server have two to four Intel Itanium 
Pentium (P4) multiprocessors with at least one Gigabyte of RAM and 160 GB of hard 
disk drive space.  The Intel Itanium processor is designed to maximize support for 
parallel processing.  Greater processing efficiencies may be achieved in software that 
takes advantage of this capability.   
Using Raid technology, multiple hard-disk drives on each of the servers 
can be configured to support mirroring (redundancy of data), striping (increased speed of 
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data access), or a combination.  In addition, multiple network-interface cards in each 
server would allow segregation of domains and further granularity of control.e 
e. Software Selection 
We suggest Plumtree portal software for the USS NEVERSAIL’s vortal-
management software for these reasons: 
• Modular design.  This enables flexibility and scalability within a particular 
vortal service, permitting additional vortal services with relative ease. 
• Well established module technology.  This ensures that other vendors have 
compatible software modules. 
• Massive parallel portal engine technology to initiate job tasks and service. 
• User access mode expandability (e.g. addition of wireless access). 
• Portal server software compatibility with IT21 standards including the 
Windows NT operating system. 
• Delivery of only HTML to the web browser.  This makes portal output 
compatible with any legacy web browser, reduces required code 
complexity on the client side, and reduces network traffic. 
• Connectivity to disparate resource and application server systems across 
the system-high classified network using common interoperable protocols 
(e.g. TCP/IP, HTTP, SOAP and LDAP) as well as provide flexibility for 
services growth.   
• Interoperability with Java applications on systems with varied operating 
systems, enabling interoperability with legacy systems. 
 




Figure 33 describes the general interoperability capabilities of the 
Plumtree portal.  As noted in the figure, several hardware manufacturers are supported. 
5. Vortal Security Policy 
The Plumtree product addresses the security policy in terms of roles, groupings, 
and content profiles.  Table 10 correlates USS NEVERSAIL’s user content levels with 
resources. 









Fuel and Weapon Status 
Information Normal 5 1
Troublecall Information Normal 8 2
Parts Ordering Normal 4 2





Email messaging system High 2 2
Chat High 1 2
 
Table 10 Correlation of User Content Levels to Resources 
 
Although the network hosting the USS NEVERSAIL vortal is a system-high 
classified network, content domains are organized based on content sensitivity (e.g. 
Classified, For Official Use Only, and Unclassified).  To ensure that content remains 
accessible to the appropriate individuals, roles, groupings and content profiling is used.  
All information is treated as classified; however, user access to the content is 
discriminated based on need-to-know and clearance level.  Need-to-know is determined 
by user group; clearance level by user role.  The combination of a user’s role and 
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assigned groups determine their associated content profile.  Content profiles are used by 
the portal servers to build the content that users are entitled to view and authorized to use. 
Availability of content is based on requirements.  Following Table 10: 
• Content is divided into three levels based on the target audience, giving 
two user levels and one content management level. 
• Content availability requirements are identified based on applicable target 
audience needs.  
• Rankings of resources indicate the priority of availability during reduced 
system capability as during maintenance and casualty response.  
To support network security architecture, firewalls will be supplemented with 
internal security policies and measures.  For example, during normal operation, the web 
server will run under the restricted rights and privileges of the process space “vortal 
user”, not under administrative privileges.  This minimizes the risks of the “vortal user”. 
Vortal servers will communicate to each other over HTTP(S).  Search services 
will communicate over a specified TCP/IP port.  Native API’s will be used by vortal 
servers to “communicate with internal resources such as file systems, domain controllers, 
or applications” (Plumtree, 2002c).  Data transferred between browsers and servers or 
between servers will be encrypted using 128 bit SSL encryption.  Data stored in 
databases or configuration files (persistent data) will use the vendor-specific security 
features as well as encryption such as the RSA 128 bit RC4 encryption algorithm to 
encrypt. 
As per the vortal goal definition, access to the USS NEVERSAIL’s vortal will be 
through an intranet over the dedicated system-high classified network.  Users can only 
gain access to the vortal is if they have access to the classified system-high network 
intranet where the vortal resides.  But a single sign-on will be implemented for user 
access. 
Figure 34 provides the basic logical diagram for the USS NEVERSAIL vortal 
using Plumtree technology.  The Plumtree core management system (corporate portal 
software) provides the necessary mechanism to implement it via Web services for 
integration of search engines, applications, content, and users. 
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Figure 34.   USS NEVERSAIL Logical Vortal Architecture (From Plumtree, 2002b) 
 
D. ARCHITECTURE 
Figure 35 displays the architecture developed for the USS NEVERSAIL vortal. 
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Figure 35.   Proposed USS NEVERSAIL Vortal Architecture (Adapted From 
Plumtree, 2002c) 
 
1. Architecture  
Content domains should be created to segregate content based on user content 
levels noted in Table 10.  For example, a user grouping known as “higher authority” may 
access reports generated from equipment casualty information, training information, and 
fuel and weapons information, but not the chat functionality. 
Data base management systems and other relational databases should be relegated 
to their own content domain and should have limited direct access.  All access to these 
databases should be through limited, pre-defined transactions and scripts that are 
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executed by a trusted agent such as a privileged internal server.  Special data access 
requirements apply to users over the satellite channel. 
Figure 36 illustrates the proposed security architecture.  Content rings 
categorically group certain data and applications available to a specific target audience.  
The thick dark line which separates the content rings represents physical separation of 
services and content that is determined by physical security requirements.  The terms 
critical and non-critical differentiate various types of data and applications, and could 
determined by a system of categorization such as the classical Department of Defense 
information sensitivity categories like Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, Unclassified, and 
For Official Use Only. 


























































Content ring three is devoted to content management.  Therefore it is only visible 
to users that authenticate, can view this content as a part of the applicable entitlement 
user groupings, and fulfill the role of content managers or content maintainers.  Content 
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ring two is devoted to internal USS NEVERSAIL personnel and is visible to those 
authenticated users who are part of the applicable entitlement groupings and fulfill the 
role of browsing user.  Content ring one is devoted to the authenticated internal and 
external USS NEVERSAIL vortal audience, are a part of the applicable entitlement 
groupings, and are visible to users who fulfill the role of browsing users. 
Security-policy critical-application points can be defined at the accesses to vortal 
databases as well as application (e.g. email, chat) as well as the portal servers that 
assemble the user entitled vortal content.  
• The six main security services provided within the USS NEVERSAIL 
vortal should be authentication, confidentiality, integrity, access control, 
non-repudiation, and availability. 
• Authentication:  We suggest this service be performed through public-key 
infrastructure and Kerberos at initial session sign-on.  This authentication 
method provides single sign-on ability. 
• Confidentiality:  We suggest this service be performed through the use of 
HTTP(S) and SSL encryption.  In addition, databases and data repositories 
have vendor-specific security mechanisms and encryptions such as RSA 
128 bit RC4 encryption.  Further, the overall network is a system-high 
classified network which has bulk encryption provided by National 
Security Agency approved cryptographic equipment and key material. 
• Integrity:  We suggest this service be managed through user roles and 
entitlement groups.  These mechanisms afford granularity of control and 
enable content managers the ability to assign to users all authorized 
actions they may perform on the data or applications to which they are 
entitled to view. 
• Access control:  We suggest this service be managed through content 
profiles associated with each vortal user.  If the user is entitled to view or 
act on the particular data or application, then it will appear in their content 
profile.  
• Non-repudiation:  We suggest this service be managed in the transaction 
audits conducted within the confines of the organizational information 
systems security policies.  All transactions are logged for audit.   
• Availability:  We suggest this service be provided only to the high-
availability resources as determined by USS NEVERSAIL leadership.  
Servers that manage this content are configured, load-balanced, and 
clustered for traffic accommodation to ensure that resources are accessible 
and usable on demand by entitled authenticated users. 
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2. Design Assessment 
Assessment scope definition is the first step of any assessment.  For example, 
time latency in satellite connectivity to the USS NEVERSAIL at sea may present 
significant limitations with regards to software running on its three networks.  Other USS 
NEVERSAIL issues that could be considered for assessment are software bandwidth and 
throughput requirements for the vortal, the impact of satellite channel bulk encryption on 
network performance within the constraints of the vortal, and the impact of satellite 
timing issues on authentication methods used in the vortal.  
Metrics define exactly what is to be measured and the limits of the measurement.  
For example, 15 milliseconds of throughput latency may have a significant impact on 
some software communications within the network.  A measure of performance could be 
this 15-millisecond latency threshold for network throughput.  
E. PROTOTYPING 
Prototyping the weather information and associated weather services functionality 
of the vortal would provide a small yet important project that has significant possibilities 
to yield success.  Available weather sites and weather related resources on the network 
could be made available through the vortal.  In addition, other possible prototypes could 
deal with email, part ordering, chat, or trouble calls, and could provide building blocks 
toward successful implementation of the vortal. 
F. DEVELOP TRAINING, MAINTENANCE & ADMINISTRATION PLANS 
The development of various plans to accommodate training, maintenance and 
administration is essential to the success of a vortal effort.  Quite often during the 
development of these plans, problem areas arise that present challenges to overcome for 
the assembled vortal team.  In the case of the USS NEVERSAIL vortal, certain aspects 
related to training, maintenance, and administration will present difficulties during 
development and implementation efforts.   
It is important to note that training is can significantly help in the development 
and implementation of a vortal solution; however, it is not a panacea.  Change associated 
with the incorporation of new technologies can be difficult for organization members to 
accept.  It seems that the longer a person has been with an organization, the more difficult 
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it is to change their behaviors.  Training may provide a mechanism to accommodate some 
of this change but it does not always solve the problems.  For example, it does no good 
for the head of the organization to declare that an organization will go paperless, train all 
members of an organization on the new paperless system, and then keep the infrastructure 
for the old paper-producing system intact.  Familiarity with the old system will inevitably 
allow some individuals the avenue to overcome the new system.  Training cannot 
overcome deeply rooted organizational behaviors if the infrastructure supporting those 
behaviors remains intact.   
Training cannot overcome challenges presented by a system that is not available 
due to a lack of maintenance or a maintenance schedule that does not support the goals of 
the vortal.  The thorough training of back-office maintainers is vital to the health of the 
network and vortal.  With that said, unless the maintainers apply that training to maintain 
the network as well as vortal hardware and software the health of the system will dictate 
availability to the user.  A less than thoroughly trained maintainer will leave a trouble call 
customer with a less than thoroughly satisfying experience.  Moreover, the hardware and 
software may be damaged if the maintainers do not know what they are doing. 
Maintenance presents another particular challenge to the development and 
implementation of a vortal.  If a vortal is designed to be easily maintained, then 
challenges may be minimized.  However, not all vortal designs can be deployed.  It may 
be that an existing network dictates some of the vortal design.  Maintenance may become 
significantly more difficult if the vortal architecture does not align with the network 
architecture to which it resides.  Conflicts and incompatibilities may arise which prevent 
the smooth delivery of information and services.  Further, with the addition of new 
resources to the vortal, maintenance issues may become more complex.  For example, if a 
particular resource has a hard-coded synchronization timeframe that does not coincide 
with other network required synchronizations, traffic over the network may be negatively 
impacted for a larger percentage of the computing day.  In addition, this synchronization 
traffic could increase the network traffic greater than acceptable limits.  Consequently, 
maintenance is directly tied to the developed network and vortal architectures. 
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Administration of the vortal is impacted by the architecture of the vortal, 
maintenance performed on the system, and the training provided to administrators.  As 
mentioned before, if the vortal architecture does not support efficiency in the 
administration of the vortal then complexities may develop that will create significant 
problems later.  For example, if the process for the addition of vortal users uses an 
automated script and the script does not perform properly due to a change in vortal 
architecture, then user content profiles may be created in a manner that prevents the 
subsequent migration of these profiles to an upgraded system.  If this problem affects 20 
users it is not significant.  However, if there are 56,000 users then this could require a 
considerable amount of man-hours to solve. 
Administration of a system that is poorly maintained may take a considerable 
amount of time and other resources.  For example, if there is not procedure for deletion of 
in valid users then the accumulation of unused profiles may exceed system resources.  
This depletion of system resources may not be significant when there are an excessive 
amount of resources available; however, when resources are low, user administration 
may become a considerable undertaking.  In addition, the performance of the system is 
related to maintenance.  Decreased performance is usually associated with a system that 
is poorly maintained.  Administration of content and other resources beyond users may 
become almost impossible if the system is not available due to poor maintenance. 
Training for administration of the vortal is very important.  A system may 
function properly and the architecture may be well developed, however, if the 
administrators are poorly trained, they may break the system and consequently impact 
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VI. COMPUTER SUPPORT FOR DOCTRINE AND POLICY 
In the dynamic hybrid information environment of the 21st century, doctrine and 
policy can be both large and complex.  They may change frequently and may not be 
complete; they may have gaps (Michael, J. 2001).  Is it necessary to check for holes in 
policy and doctrine or the impact of a particular change within them?  As discussed 
before, they do provide direct guidance in the formulation of the organization’s mission 
as well as organization policies.  Changes to these may not be easily discernible and may 
have an impact on overall organization requirements as well as security requirements.  
Unless these changes are analyzed for impact (i.e. what they do and do not provide) then 
an organization's information system and its associated security requirements may 
include unnecessary things that can translate into embedded vulnerabilities.   
It is possible to create automated policy-governing tools which reason and 
maintain policy at high levels of performance.  In a network-centric warfare environment, 
the Navy can gain a competitive advantage through being able to quickly refine new or 
changing policy and doctrine into requirements and other system artifacts.  Automated 
policy-governing tools have important implications in the formulation and maintenance 
of vortal policies including its security policy.   
Vortal security policies are developed from vortal requirements and the 
organization's information-system security policy, and its formulation is impacted by 
higher-level policies and doctrine as well as organization policies and mission.  The 
delayed propagation of higher-level document changes can negatively impact security of 
a future or current vortal solution.  This suggests that these automated policy-governing 
tools could appropriately respond to dynamic changes in the hybrid information 
environment or higher-level documents.  Consequently, they could be used to assist with 
the rapid development and maintenance of vortal security requirements.  This could 





























The required quantity and delivery speeds of vital data, information and services 
necessary to adequately support the Navy greatly exceeds what is currently provided.  To 
support the Chief of Naval Operation’s vision of “Sea Power 21” and its component 
Navy initiatives, mechanisms such as vortals that allow for the timely collaboration, 
integration, aggregation and consolidation of vital data, information, and services can be 
critically important.  Vortals, for which we can apply security at the concept stage of the 
development process, can provide the required framework to successfully support current 
and future Navy initiatives.  Consequently, the study of security architecture, doctrine, 
policy and implementation for vortals is needed to develop innovative and 
transformational ways to securely implement these essential mechanisms.   
Vortals provide, through a single user interface, specific narrow-scoped data, 
information, and services to a specific target audience.  The secure vortal architecture 
presented provides a framework for the development of concepts for successful 
implementation of secure vortals as well as a starting point for additional efforts.  Further, 
the provided secure vortal development diagram and the adapted MODELS Information 
Architecture provide a context as well as mechanisms for the successful implementation 
of secure vortal architecture.   
A. FUTURE WORK 
Vortal security research presents many opportunities to make advances in a field 
that holds much promise for both the Department of the Navy as well as the private 
sector.   
• Effective and efficient policy and doctrine within the context of vortal 
security needs further study.  Doctrine provides the context within which 
policy may be applied; policy codifies the accepted practices for vortal 
implementers.  Doctrine and policy, taken together, enable the 
standardization of successful implementation strategies across a set of 
specific vortal solutions.  In addition, doctrine also provides the context to 
apply policy within a specific set of limitations such as those outlined by 
the vortal security architecture and the secure vortal development diagram 
of this thesis.  Further, automated tools which formulate requirements 
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from doctrine and policy may enable the rapid vortal solution development 
necessary to fulfill critical just-in-time user requirements.   
• The key to the effectiveness of a secure vortal implementation lies in 
prototyping and testing.  Prototyping and testing provides additional data 
that can be used for implementation refinement purposes.  Additionally, 
prototyping and testing can be used to prove the effectiveness of applied 
theory.  More research needs to be applied to these topics. 
The methodology presented within this document could prove valuable for other 
types of portals.  For this premise to be proven correct, scalability prototyping and testing 
must be conducted.  Prototyping and testing may provide refinement and proposed-
change inputs to existing methodology which may be necessary for other portals.  
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APPENDIX A.  LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ABUSE Case A particular type of UML Use Case that focuses on the behavior 
that may be harmful to a computing system. 
ACI Autonomy Content Infrastructure; proprietary plug-in technology 
for communications between enterprise applications 
ACL Access Control List 
API Application Programming Interface 
ASP  Application Server Page 
B2E  Business to Employees 
CA Certificate Authority; the trusted service authority in public key 
infrastructure 
CGI Common Gateway Interface 
CMS  Core Management System 
COI  Critical Operational Issues 
CRM  Customer Relationship Management 
DBMS  Database Management System 
DMZ Demilitarized Zone; a common name for untrusted perimeter 
networks 
DOC Microsoft Word Document Format 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DITSCAP Department of Defense Information Technology Security 
Certification and Accreditation Process 
DRE Dynamic Reasoning Engine; a proprietary technology from 
Autonomy 
EJB Enterprise Java Bean; a proprietary technology from SUN 
Microsystems 
ERP  Enterprise Resource Planning 
GB  Gigabyte 
GUI  Graphical User Interface 
HCI  Human-Computer Interaction 
HTML  Hypertext Markup Language 
HTTP  Hypertext Transport Protocol 
HTTP(S)  Hypertext Transport Protocol, Secure 
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IP  Internet Protocol 
IT21  Information Technology 21 standard 
JSP  Java Server Pages 
J2EE  Java 2 Platform, Enterprise Edition 
JTA  Joint Technical Architecture 
KDC Key Distribution Center; trusted authority in Kerberos 
authentication 
LDAP Light-weight Directory Access Protocol 
MIA  MODEL Information Architecture 
NNTP  Network News Transfer Protocol 
NTLM  Windows NT Logon Management 
ODBC  Open Database Connectivity 
OID  Oracle Internet Directory 
ORIS  Organizational Information System 
PHP Personal Home Page; an open source pre-processor language 
similar to ASP or JSP 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
RAM Random Access Memory 
RDBMS Relational Database Management System 
RTF Rich Text Format 
SGML Standard Generalized Markup Language 
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol 
SQL Structured Query Language 
SSL Secure Socket Layer 
SSO Single Sign-On 
ST Service Ticket; used in Kerberos authentication to enable the 
session use of a particular service 
TCP  Transport Control Protocol 
TF WEB  Task Force Web 
TGT Ticket Granting Ticket; used in Kerberos authentication to enable 
the user to be able to request an ST for use of particular service 
UDDI  Universal Description, Discovery and Integration 
UML  Universal Modeling Language 
URL  Universal Resource Locator 
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Use Case A UML mechanism used to describe a complete transaction within 
a system and its actors 
Vortal Vertical Industry Portal 
VPD Virtual Private Database 
WebDAV Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning 
WSDL Web Service Description Language 
X.509 Standard for defining digital certificates which enable PKI based 
authentication. 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
100 
APPENDIX B.  HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION AND 
USABILITY RESOURCES 
Ask Tog: First Principles.  http://www.asktog.com/basics/firstPrinciples.html 
Bad Human Factors Designs.  http://www.baddesigns.com/ 
Bastien, C., Scapin, D. & Leulier, C.  Looking for Usability Problems with the 
Ergonomic Criteria and with the ISO 9241-10 Dialogue Principles. 
Bevan, N.  Human-Computer Interaction Standards.  
Bevan, N.  Usability Issues in Website Design.  
Bevan, N., Kirakowski, J. & Maissel, J.  What is Usability?  
Bevan, N. & Macleod, M.  Usability Measurement in Context. 
Flanders, V.  1998.  Web Pages That Suck: Learn Good Design by Looking at Bad 
Design. http://www.webpagesthatsuck.com/ New York, NY: Sybex. 
HCI Bibliography.  http://www.hcibib.org/ 
HCI Resources on the Net.  http://www.ida.liu.se/labs/aslab/groups/um/hci/ 
Homl, J.  Usability Methods Toolbox. 
Instone, K.  How to Test Usability . 
Interface Hall of Shame.  http://www.iarchitect.com/shame.htm 
Kirakowski, J. The Use of Questionnaire Methods for Usability Assessment.  
Kirakowski, J. & Cierlik, B.  Measuring the Usability of Websites.  
Kirakowski, J., Claridge, N. & Whitehand, R.  Human Centered Measures of Success in 
Website Design.  
Lynch, P. and Horton, S.  1999.  Web Style Guide: Basic Design Principles for Creating 
Web Sites.  http://info.med.yale.edu/caim/manual/contents.html. Yale University Press.   
Macleod, M.  Usability: Practical Methods for Testing and Improvement.   
Macleod, M.  Usability in Context: Improving Quality of Use. 
Macleod, M., Bowden, R. & Bevan, N.  The Music Performance Measurement Method.   
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Macleod, M. & Rengger, R. The Development of DRUM: A Software Tool for Video-
Assisted Usability Evaluation.  
Melchior, E. et al.  Usability Study.  
Morkes, J. & Nielsen, J.  Concise, Scannable, and Objective.  
Nielsen, J.  Characteristics of Usability Problems Found by Heuristic Evaluation.  
Nielsen, J.  Heuristic Evaluation.  
Nielsen, J.  Ten Usability Heuristics.  
Nielsen, J.  Cost of User Testing a Website.  
NIST. Common Industry Format for Usability Test Reports.  
Usability First.  http://www.usabilityfirst.com/ 
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